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xv1 Introduction and overview
Abstract
This chapter provides an introduction to the subject of this study.
Furthermore, it gives an overview of the other chapters.Chapter /
1 Introduction
During the eighties Western Europe suffered from high and persistent unem-
ployment. Different from what the neoclassical perfect competition model
suggests, the labour market did not clear via wage rate adjustment. To explain
this phenomenon several theories are put forward in the literature in this field.
Firstly, there is renewed interest in the role of trade unions in wage and
employment determination. Secondly, the efficiency wage theory is proposed
to explain why unemployment may be an equilibrium phenomenon. The
efficiency wage hypothesis is based on the assumption that there is a positive
causal relationship between the wage rate and the worker's productivity. Third-
ly, unemployment is explained by the difference in bargaining status between
employed (insiders) and unemployed workers (outsiders).
Of the three theories mentioned above I consider union bargaining theory
as the most important in explaining wages and (unemployment. The reason
is that in Western Europe trade unions play such a dominant role in wage
determination. In the Netherlands, for example, 80 per cent of the employees
is covered by some collective wage agreement. As set out in chapter 2, the
three basic models in union bargaining theory are the monopoly model, the
right-to-manage model and the efficient bargain model. In the first two models
the bargaining outcome is on the firm's labour demand curve, in the efficient
bargain model it is not. An outcome off the demand curve results when union
and firm bargain about both wage rate and employment. Whereas bargaining
about employment is rare in most Western European countries, it seems
unlikely that outcomes off the labour demand curve will result. Therefore, the
monopoly model and the right-to-manage model seem most relevant.
The previous paragraph may suggest that the three theories do exclude each
other. That is not true, however. Several authors introduce a trade union to
pursue the goals of the insiders. In this respect insider-outsider theory can be
interpreted as a complement to union bargaining theory. The relationship
between insider-outsider theory and efficiency wage theory is investigated by
Lindbeck and Snower (1991). They present a model which combines insider-
outsider and efficiency wage effects. They conclude that the model implies that
insider-outsider and efficiency wage effects do not reinforce one another. In
chapter 4 I will argue that their conclusion is not correct. Insider-outsider and
efficiency wage effects appear to reinforce one another. The relationship
between union bargaining theory and efficiency wage theory is less clear. In
chapter 5 I will show that the theories can be combined.
Despite its attractiveness, union bargaining theory does not exlain everything
about wages and (unemployment. One phenomenon that the theory does not
explain is that in unionized labour markets the average wage rate rises mostly
somewhat faster than the average contract wage rate. This phenomenon, which
is called wage drift, is observed in countries such as Scandinavia and theNetherlands. So far, the theoretical explanations offered for wage drift are
somewhat ad hoc. A recent exception is Holden (1989). His explanation is
based on the assumption that workers bargain collectively at firm level after
wage negotiations at national or industry level. This assumption does not apply
in the Netherlands, where wage drift arises mainly through interaction between
the employer and the individual employee. Whereas strikes can be used to
threat the firm in collective bargaining, the individual worker can only threat
to quit or to shirk. Therefore, wage drift which arises at the individual level
requires another explanation than proposed by Holden. Besides explaining
wage drift itself, the relationship between contract wage changes and wage
drift requires more attention. For example, it is unclear whether wage drift is
an alternative for contract wage increases or an independent additive to
contract wage increases. In chapter S I propose a model which combines union
bargaining theory and efficiency wage theory to explain contract wage changes
and wage drift. This model is applied empirically to investigate the relationship
between contract wage changes and wage drift.
Another phenomenon which union bargaining theory does not explain is that
unemployment is concentrated among specific groups of workers. One can
explain this by arguing that the union is only interested in employment of its
members. This assumption is adopted in the insider-outsider model proposed
by Carruth and Oswald (1987). If their assumption is correct, nonmembers are
never employed under a monopoly trade union. I have two objections against
the approach which emphasizes the role of union membership in wage
formation. One objection is that, unless there is a closed shop, the union is
unable to select workers. In this situation unemployment is more or less
equally spread among members and nonmembers (more or less, because some
workers might change membership status while becoming (unemployed).
Another objection is that the labour market is not as static as the approach
suggests. Due to labour turnover the population of employed workers (called
membership in these models) changes from year to year. If one wants to
introduce heterogeneity of labour in models of union wage formation it must
not be the distinction between members and nonmembers. Since unemployment
is concentrated among workers with little education and working experience
I propose in chapter 6 to make a distinction between trained workers with high
human capital endowments and untrained workers with low endowments.
The purpose of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Firstly, to
evaluate the contribution of union bargaining theory, efficiency wage theory
and insider-outsider theory to the explanation of wage formation, employment
and unemployment. Secondly, to present an empirical application of union
wage setting theory to the Netherlands (1965-1987). Thirdly, to investigate
theoretically the relationship between insider-outsider and efficiency wage
effects. Fourthly, to investigate empirically the relationship between contract
wage changes and wage drift. Finally, to offer a theoretical explanation forC/wpfer /
unemployment of untrained workers. A more extensive overview of each
chapter is given below.
2 Overview
Chapter 2 summarizes the theory and empirical evidence on union wage
formation and employment. The theoretical part starts with a discussion of the
assumptions with respect to the union's and the firm's preferences. Secondly,
the three basic models, the monopoly union model (Dunlop (1944)), the right-
to-manage model (Nickell (1982)) and the efficient bargain model (Leontief
(1946), McDonald and Solow (1981)), are presented as special cases of the
more general sequential bargaining model by Manning (1987). Thirdly, the
implications of recent contributions in game theory to wage bargaining are
discussed. The empirical evidence can be split into two parts. The first part
contains estimates on revealed union preferences. The second part summarizes
the results of testing between the three basic models.
Chapter 3 presents an empirical model of union wage setting and unem-
ployment. The basic idea of the model, which is also found in Layard and
Nickell (1985, 1986, 1987) and in Layard et al. (1991), is that there are several
'push' factors which incite the union to demanding a higher wage rate. These
factors include taxes, social security payments and the gap between consumer
and producer prices. A new element in the model is that attention is paid to the
role of labour productivity in union wage setting. The model is estimated with
annual data of the private sector in the Netherlands (1965-1987). The analysis
suggests that Dutch unemployment has been pushed up by the increase in tax
rates and the price gap, but has been reduced by productivity effects.
Chapter 4 considers whether efficiency wages can explain unemployment.
Theoretically the hypothesis that high wages improve worker productivity
provides an explanation for natural or structural unemployment. One objection
against this explanation is that more complex contracts may provide incentives
to workers without causing unemployment. Another objection is that efficiency
wages do not cause unemployment if there is a competitive secondary sector.
The empirical evidence supports that high wages reduce shirking and tumover
and increase productivity. It remains unclear whether the efficiency wage
effects are sufficiently strong and sufficiently widespread to cause unemploy-
ment. Further the relations between unions and efficiency wages and between
insiders-outsiders and efficiency wages are discussed. The chapter shows that
insider-outsider and efficiency wage effects, if combined in a simple model,
reinforce one another if the worker has complete market power. This result
contrasts with the conclusion by Lindbeck and Snower (1991).
In chapter 5 an efficiency wage model is proposed to explain wage drift. In
the literature wage drift is attributed to excess demand for labour, productivity
increases of piece workers, price increases, excess profits, distortions of the//t/rodurr/on
relative wage structure, tax rates and inventories. So far, no coherent
theoretical explanation for this phenomenon has been provided. It is shown that
most of the hypotheses mentioned before fit in the proposed model. The model
is estimated with aggregate data from the Netherlands (1972-1983). In line
with the theoretical model wage drift appears to be positively related to price
changes and changes in the vacancy rate and negatively related to contract
wage changes and changes in the unemployment rate.
Chapter 6 summarizes and presents two approaches to distinguish insiders
and outsiders in models of union wage determination. In the union membership
approach, which is adopted by Carruth and Oswald (1987), the insiders are
union members and the outsiders are nonmembers. In the human capital
approach the insiders are trained workers and the outsiders are untrained
workers. The two approaches appear to have different implications. Firstly, in
the union membership approach a monopoly union will not allow employment
of outsiders. In the human capital approach the union might set the wage rate
such that besides all insiders some outsiders are hired as well. Secondly, in the
union membership approach the contract curve coincides with the downward-
sloping labour demand curve for employment levels beyond the number of
insiders if union and firm bargain efficiently about wages and employment. In
the human capital approach the contract curve is upward sloping for
employment levels beyond the number of outsiders.
Chapter 7 summarizes the literature on insider-outsider and duration effects
in union wage setting. It is argued that these theories imply testable effects of
previous employment, unemployment and long-term unemployment on the
wage rate. The empirical results can be interpreted as evidence in favour of
some versions of insider-outsider theory and duration theory. The effects may
cause some persistence in unemployment. They are, however, not strong
enough to cause full hysteresis.
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the study. Furthermore, it describes
some policy implications and offers some suggestions for further research.Union wage formation and employment:
a review
Abstract
This chapter provides a survey of recent theoretical and
empirical research on union wage formation and employment.
The basic models of union wage formation and employment,
the monopoly model, the right-to-manage model and the
efficient bargain model, are presented in a unified framework.
Finally, the empirical evidence on union preferences and on
the performance of the various models is discussed.1 Introduction
The relationship between trade unions, wages and employment has gained
interest in the last decade, because it was recognized that the high
unemployment rates in Western Europe are possibly related to labour
market institutions. The integration of trade unions in economic theory dates
back to the work by Dunlop (1944) and Leontief (1946). and is popularized
by McDonald and Solow (1981) and Oswald (1982). In the words of
Oswald (1982), "at the heart of the approach is the notion that the trade
union is like any other economic agent and can be thought of as attempting,
subject to certain constraints, to maximize an objective function" (p. 576).
The purpose of this chapter is to present a survey of the theory of union
wage formation and employment and to summarize the empirical evidence
in this area. Due to limitations of space several topics are not included. To
compensate for these omissions, some references are given. Firstly, a review
on the relationship between trade unions and the government is provided by
Abraham (1989). Secondly, the issue of trade unions and productivity is
reviewed in Addison and Hirsch (1989) and in Kraft (1989). Thirdly,
contributions on union wage setting and taxation are offered by Hersoug
(1984). Hersoug et al. (1986), Malcomson and Sartor (1987) and Van
Rompuy et al. (1988). Fourthly, the relationship between centralization of
union wage setting and unemployment is taken up by Calmfors and Driffill
(1988), Freeman (1988) and Jackman et al. (1990). Fifthly, Lewis (1986)
deals with the relative wage effects of trade unions. Finally, the impact of
unions on investment is reviewed by Lever and Van Veen (1991).
Earlier survey articles include Oswald (1985), Pencavel (1985), Farber
(1986) and Addison (1989). Recent textbooks are written by Hirsch and
Addison (1986) and by Carruth and Oswald (1989). The surveys by Oswald,
Pencavel and Farber and the textbook by Hirsch and Addison were
published too early to cover some recent contributions, such as the
sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987a). Nor do these reviews
include the bulk of empirical studies testing between two competing models
of union wage setting and employment, which were published in the past
few years. Addison's survey is more up to date, but differs in scope from
ours. We present the basic models of union wage formation and
employment in the encompassing sequential bargaining framework, while
Addison refers to this framework only in the conclusions. Of course, Hirsch
and Addison (1986) and Carruth and Oswald (1989) cover some subjects
which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theore-
tical literature on union wage formation and employment. Section 3
summarizes the empirical research on union preferences and on the perfor-
8t/nion wage /brmaf/wi om/ e/np/o vm«i/
mance of the various models. An evaluation of the state of the art and
suggestions for further research are offered in section 4.
2 Modelling union wage formation and employment
According to Johnson (1975) "the problem of modelling trade union
behaviour has proved to be virtually intractable. This is because (1) there is
no consensus on the goals of union activity ... such as exists with respect to
the firm or consumer and (2) the received pure theory of bargaining is
devoid of operational content" (pp. 23-24). Although there is no consensus
on some important issues, the problem is not considered as intractable any
more. Several concepts, such as utility maximization subject to a budget
constraint, were borrowed from consumer theory. This paved the way for a
large number of contributions to modelling trade union behaviour. The
review of theoretical work starts in 2.1 with a discussion of union prefe-
rences. The basic models of union wage formation and employment are
presented in 2.2. In 2.3 the seniority model is discussed. The game theoretic
foundation for the Nash bargaining solution and the modelling of the
disagreement points are considered in 2.4.
2.1 Union preferences
"Are trade unions economic or political entities?" Under this title. Burton
(1981) joined the debate which started between Ross and Dunlop about the
role of trade unions in society. Dunlop (1944) suggested to represent trade
union preferences by a wage bill objective. Ross (1948) criticized the
approach, arguing that trade unions are primarily political organizations.
Although many economists would not deny the political function of trade
unions, Dunlop's approach is widely accepted as an appropriate way of
integrating trade unions in economic theory. One reason for this popularity
is probably that the approach of Dunlop fits in the neoclassical methodology
of explaining economic agents' behaviour by modelling preferences and
constraints and by solving a maximization problem. Union preferences have
often been formalized by specifying a utility function. Before discussing
functional forms, it seems appropriate to discuss what the arguments of a
utility function should be.
Following Dunlop, many authors have assumed that unions care about
their members' wage rate and about the employment level. It is, however,
less clear whether union membership is exogenous, and also how the wage
rate and the employment level should be defined. Mostly, union
membership is assumed to be fixed and exogenous, which is not quite
satisfying. There have been some attempts to make it endogenous; cf.
Grossman (1983), Booth (1984) and Kidd and Oswald (1987). A secondissue is whether nominal or real wages should enter the utility function.
Most people agree that workers are primarily interested in the real wage
rate and that money illusion is absent. It is questionable, however, whether
unions are able to set the real wage rate, because the price level is not
under their discretion; cf. Solow (1986). A third issue is whether employ-
ment itself should enter the utility function, or that employment relative to
membership or to labour supply is the relevant concept. Stated differently,
do unions care about unemployment? These are important questions, which
deserve more attention.
The utility function representing union preferences is generally required
to be increasing and quasi-concave in the wage rate and the employment
level. Among the functional forms which have been proposed in the
literature is, firstly, the Stone-Geary function
, „ „ (1)
where G, W and N denote union utility, the wage rate and the employment
level, respectively. Throughout this chapter wages, as well as benefits,
revenues and profits, are assumed to be in real terms. W„ and N„ can be
interpreted as minimum or reference levels of wages and employment. 8
reflects the relative importance of wages and employment above the
reference level.
Secondly, the expected utility or utilitarian utility function is widely
found. The expected utility function is of the form (abusing notation)
G(HW)-£*(HO*iL±s(fl), VV^fi, N<M, (2)
Af Af
while the utilitarian function is specified as
G(WJV)-Ate(MO+(Af-AO«(fl), W£fl, /V<M, (3)
where M denotes union membership and B represents the unemployment
benefit or the alternative wage. Both union membership and the alternative
wage are assumed to be exogenous in this thesis. Note that if union
membership is fixed, the two utility functions are equivalent. The idea
behind the expected utility function, which is e.g. adopted by McDonald
and Solow (1981), is that every member has a chance of N/M of being
employed and a chance of (M-N)/M of being unemployed. The employed
members enjoy utility g(W) from the wage rate they earn, while the
unemployed achieve utility g(B) from the unemployment benefit or the
alternative wage. The utilitarian function reflects the idea that the union
treats all members identically and that the union's utility is the sum of its
members' utility.
If the individual worker is uncertain about the wage rate he/she will earn,
preferences with respect to risk become important. The utility function g(W)
10l/mon wagf /ormaf/on
in the expected utility or utilitanan utility function can represent these
preferences. The functional form which is most popular assumes constant
relative risk aversion: g(W)=W*/5. By differentiation of g, it is easy to see
that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, which is defined as
r=-Wg"/g', equals 1-8. If 8<1 (r>0), workers are said to be risk averse; if
&>1 (r<0), they are risk loving; if 6=1 (r=0), they are called risk neutral.
The Stone-Geary function (1) includes as special cases two objectives
which were proposed in the early literature. Dunlop (1944) proposed a
union objective function of the form G(W,N)=WN, which is known as the
wage bill maximization hypothesis. To see that the Stone-Geary function
includes the wage bill maximization hypothesis, set W„=N(,=O and 6=0.5.
Note further that max (WNf is equivalent to max WN, because the
solution to an optimization problem is invariant under positive monotonie
transformations. Rosen (1970) and De Menu (1971) suggested an objective
of the form G(W,N)=(W-W^)N, where W, denotes the competitive wage
rate. The objective function measures the rents of unionization. The
utilitarian utility function (3) is a straightforward extension of the wage bill
maximization objective.
Comparing the Stone-Geary (1) and the expected utility (2) or utilitarian
utility function (3), the former has the advantage of its flexibility, which is
convenient for empirical work. The latter utility functions have the advan-
tage of including the utility of workers not employed by the firm. Further,
these functions are derived from individual workers' preferences, while this
is not the case with the Stone-Geary function. References of empirical
applications of the Stone-Geary function and the expected utility or utili-
tarian utility function are found in section 3. Oswald (1985) provides a list
of authors using either of these utility functions in theoretical work.
Oswald (1984, 1987a) criticizes the implicit assumption in the utilitarian
utility function that workers are laid-off at random. He presents evidence for
Britain and the United States that in practice lay-offs are by inverse
seniority. Therefore, the median union member should not be afraid of
losing his/her job. Under majority voting the "union's preferences can be
thought of merely as the desire for higher wages" (1987; p. 12). Oswald
proposes an alternative utility function
for W>B, A/aV,, (4)
where N, is the minimum employment level at which the worker with
median seniority is employed. Oswald does not define G(W,N) for N<N,. A
natural extension would be
for W>B, AWV,. (5)
I accept Oswald's criticism of the implicit assumption of random lay-offs,
but at this stage I am unwilling to conclude that unions do not care about
11employment. Firstly, Ross (1948) already argued that union leadership may
be expected to pursue their own interests rather than those of the member-
ship. Secondly, there is no reason to assume a priori that the median
member is only interested in his own wage. "Altruism may well not be a
relevant factor in a number of cases, but at the same time in parts of North
American and West European societies there are deep traditions of working
class fellowship and in such instances it would be short-sighted to presume
that such sentiments have no behavioral consequences" (Pencavel (1985); p.
199). Thirdly, under centralized wage bargaining or decentralized financing
of social security the union should take into account that the wedge between
the gross wage rate and the net wage rate probably rises with the unemploy-
ment rate. Therefore, I am not convinced that union indifference curves are
(always and everywhere) flat in the (W,N) space. In 3.2 1 will examine
some empirical evidence on this issue.
2.2 Basic models
Manning (1987a,b,c) presents a sequential bargaining model which
encompasses all basic models of union wage formation and employment.
His general model is adopted to present the monopoly model, the right-to-
manage model and the efficient bargain model. After presentation of the
general model as set out in Manning (1987a), it is shown how the respecti-
ve models can be obtained by restrictions on the relative bargaining power
of union and firm.
In the sequential bargaining model the bargaining process is divided into
two stages. In the first stage the union and the firm bargain over the wage
rate (or the employment level) and in the second over the employment level
(or the wage rate). The relative bargaining power of the union and the firm
may differ in the two stages. Assume that the sequence of bargaining is that
the wage rate is determined before employment. This is called the wage-
employment sequential bargain. Let G(W,N) and H(W,N) respectively
denote the union's and the firm's utility function with respect to real wage
rate and employment. G and H are assumed to be quasi-concave. Let A. and
u (0<X,uSl) be measures of the union's influence over wage rate and
employment, respectively. In the second stage of the bargaining process
employment is chosen taking the wage rate as given. That is, employment is
chosen so as to solve
max ulogG(W;v>(l-u)log//(W'//). ~v
The solution to this problem, which is assumed to be unique, may be
written as N(W,u). In the first stage of the bargaining process, the wage rate
is chosen so as to solve
12t/mon wagf /ormafi'ewi and
max AJogG[WJV(W.u)]+(l-A.)log«[lV,/V(W,n)]. ,7)
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Equations (6) and (7) characterize the sequential bargaining model. Now, let
us consider the implications of some restrictions on bargaining power and
on preferences.
Firstly, assume that employment is determined by the firm and that the
wage rate is set by the union, i.e. let X=l, u=0. Assume further that the
firm's preferences are represented by its short-run profit function
where R(N) denotes the firm's revenues (in real terms). Under these




The first order condition gives the inverse of the labour demand equation
/?'(/V)=W. (10)
As the revenue function is monotone, (10) can be inverted to give the




In other words, the union maximizes its utility function under the restriction
that the outcome is on the labour demand curve. This model of wage and
employment determination is known in literature as the monopoly model. It
dates back to Dunlop (1944), and was formalized by Fellner (1947) and
Cartter (1959). The model is illustrated in figure 1. The labour demand
curve is downward sloping, because of diminishing marginal returns (R"<0).
The union indifference curves are convex, due to the quasi-concavity of the
utility function. The highest attainable indifference curve for the union is
tangent to the firm's labour demand curve.
Secondly, retain the assumption that the employment level is chosen uni-
laterally by the firm, but assume that wages are determined in a bargaining
process between union and firm, i.e. assume (KX^l, u=0. Let the firm again
maximize short-run profits by solving (9). Making use of the monotony of
the exponential function, the optimization problem in the first stage (7) can
be written as
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The bargaining problem amounts to maximizing an asymmetric Nash
bargaining function (Harsanyi and Selten (1972)) of union and firm utility
under the restriction that the outcome is on the labour demand curve The




where G< and n, denote the disagreement or threat point of the union and
the firm, respectively. This kind of model is introduced by Nickell (1982)
and Nickell and Andrews (1983) under the name 'right-to-manage model'
referring to managerial freedom to set the employment level. The monopoly
mode is a special case of the right-to-manage model. The right-to-manage
model is also called labour demand curve equilibrium model (MaCurdy and
Pencavel (1986)) or shortly labour demand curve model. The model is illus-
trated in figure 2. Note that the wage employment outcome is the point of
tangency of an isoquant of the Nash product and the labour demand curve
It is also a point of intersection of the labour demand curve and a union
indifference curve (not drawn).
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Figure 2 Right-to-manage model
Thirdly, assume that each party's bargaining power in the first stage is
equal to its own bargaining power in the second stage, i.e. let X=u. Assume
the firm's objective is to maximize short-run profits. Then the sequential




after determining the wage rate by solving
max
where N(W,X) is the solution of (14). Note that the objective function in
(14) and (15) is the same, while the function in (15) is evaluated in the
optimum of (14). Therefore, the envelope theorem can be invoked to
combine (14) and (15) to
max [G(W,N)f[n(W.N)]'"\ (16)
Again, the presented model is a special case of the more general model
max
The optimization problem results in an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. Irrespective of the value of X, these solutions satisfy the first-order
condition
ISFigure 3 Efficient bargain model
G, O,
(18)
The first equality reminds us of the contract curve of Edgeworth (1881).
Therefore, this kind of model is called efficient bargain model, contract
curve equilibrium model (MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986)) or shortly contract
curve model. The idea of bargaining about both wages and employment is
introduced by Leontief (1946). More recently, it is found in Hall and Lilien
(1979) and McDonald and Solow (1981). The contract curve, in figure 3
denoted by CC', consists of points of tangency of union indifference curves
and firm's isoprofit curves. If both the individual worker is risk averse and
the union has utilitarian preferences, the contract curve is upward sloping
(dW/dN>0).
As the name of the model suggests, contracts which result from the effi-
cient bargain model are Pareto efficient with respect to trade union and
firm, while contracts which originate from the monopoly model or the right-
to-manage model are not. In figure 3 it can be seen that point A, which is
on the labour demand curve, is a point of intersection of a union
indifference curve and a firm's isoprofit curve. At the south-east of this
point, there is an area enclosed by this indifference curve and this isoprofit
curve in which both the union and the firm are better off. The union comes
at a higher indifference curve, while the firm reaches a lower isoprofit
curve, corresponding to a higher profit level. This result is no coincidence,
because it is easy to show that the union indifference curve is downward
sloping (dW/dN | [G(W,N)=GO]=-GJAJ,<O) and the isoprofit curve reaches a
16i/m'o/i wage /ormarion and
maximum at the labour demand curve (dW/dN | [n(W.N)=no)=-nj/n,=O,
because Fl2=0 at the labour demand curve). At points on the contract curve
no Pareto improvements are possible. The indifference curves and the
isoprofit curves have the same slope at points of tangency. Therefore, there
is no area where one party can be made better off without making the other
party worse off.
Bargaining outcomes resulting from the efficient bargain model are not
enforceable. This is seen as follows. Take a point in the (W.N) space which
is on the contract curve, but is off the labour demand curve; for example,
point B in figure 3. At the going wage rate, the firm can reach a lower
isoprofit curve, corresponding to a higher profit level, by reducing em-
ployment until it is on the labour demand curve. In other words, there is an
incentive for the firm to cheat. If the union is unable to enforce such a
contract, it probably prefers a contract with a high wage rate and a low
employment level according to the labour demand curve model to a contract
with a lower wage rate and a higher employment level according to the
contract curve model. This suggests that efficiency can be improved by
incentive compatible contracts, which make it unprofitable for the firm to
deviate. Leontief (1946) and, more recently, Hall and Lilien (1979) show
that such contracts can be devised by specifying a wage rate or a wage bill
which is contingent on the employment level. Profit maximization by the
firm (R'(N)=W(N)+NW'(N)) leads to the efficient employment level if the
contract is specified such that the firm internalizes the union's opportunity
cost of supplying labour. Under uncertainty and asymmetric information, e.g
about the firm's product demand, the scope of contingent contracts is
limited, due to costs of gathering information and problems of moral ha-
zard. More on this issue is found in e.g. Hall and Lilien (1979), Malcomson
(1983), Horn and Svensson (1986), Black and Bulkley (1984, 1989) and
Oswald (1987b).
Besides the models discussed above, the sequential bargaining framework
offers a new class of models in which the union's influence over
employment is neither zero (u*0), nor equal to the union's influence over
the wage rate (fatu). This has an important implication for empirically
testing between bargaining outcomes on the labour demand curve and on
the contract curve (for a summary cf. subsection 3.2 of this chapter). If
observed wage rates and employment levels tum out to be inconsistent with
the labour demand curve model, this model can be rejected. However, this
does not imply that the outcomes arc on the contract curve. The sequential
bargaining framework shows that there is a whole class of models which
lead to bargaining outcomes which are neither on the labour demand curve,
nor on the contract curve.
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2.3 Seniority model
As explained before, Oswald (1984, 1987a) criticizes the standard utility
functions (l)-(3). He argues that the implicit assumption that lay-offs are by
random draw is incorrect. In his seniority model, which is an alternative to
the efficient bargain model of section 2.2, lay-offs are by inverse seniority.
In order to specify union preferences let N, denote the minimum
employment level at which the worker with median seniority is employed;
see (4). This implies that the initial employment level at which all workers
are employed is 2N,. Union preferences are specified such that the
indifference curves are horizontal in the (W,N) space for NSN,. For obvious
reasons his model is also called flat indifference curve model.
In the seniority model the firm's minimum profit level is assumed to be





The model is illustrated in figure 4. Union's utility is maximized at the
highest attainable indifference curve. If the restriction N^N, is not binding,
G-G,
AT
Figure 4 Seniority model
Whereas the efficient bargain model in 2.2 is written as an asymmetric
Nash bargaining problem, the seniority model is written as a constrained
maximization problem. The difference is not relevant, because the efficient
bargain model can be written as a constrained maximization problem as well.
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this indifference curve is tangent to the minimum isoprofit contour. The
point of tangency is at the maximum of the isoprofit curve, which is on the
firm's labour demand curve. If the restriction N£N, binds, union's utility is
maximized at the point of intersection of the line N=N, and the minimum
isoprofit curve. Corner equilibria are likely to be exceptional. Only a
startling market shock could produce a comer allocation, because the initial
employment level was twice as high. Oswald concludes that efficient
contracts are on the labour demand curve.
2.4 Bargaining theory
In presenting the basic models of union wage setting and employment in
section 2.2 two issues have been neglected. Firstly, the usage of the Nash
bargaining solution has not been justified. Secondly, no attention has been
paid to the effect of threats on the bargaining outcome. Since there have
been important contributions on these issues in recent years, they are taken
up in this section.
Basically, two approaches can be distinguished in solving a bargaining
problem, namely the axiomatic approach and the strategic approach. In the
axiomatic approach assumptions are made about the bargaining outcome
without specifying the bargaining process. In the words of Nash (1953),
"one states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the
solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually determine
the solution uniquely" (p. 219). The strategic approach describes the
bargaining process itself. As Rubinstein (1982) points out, "the players'
negotiating maneuvers are moves in a noncooperative game" (p. 98). Nash
(1953) already tried to complement the axiomatic approach proposed in
Nash (1950) with the strategic approach. According to Rubinstein (1982),
the models proposed by Nash are highly stylized and artificial.
Binmore et al. (1986) establish the relationship between the two
approaches. They present two strategic bargaining models in which the
outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution. In the first model the
parties' incentive to reach an agreement is the bargainers' time preference.
In the second model it is the exogenous risk of breakdown of negotiation.
The utility functions are chosen to reflect the incentive to settle. In the time-
preference model they reflect the relative impatience of the parties to settle.
In the exogenous-risk model the utility functions express the parties' atti-
tudes towards risk. The choice of the disagreement or threat points depends
on the context as well. In the time-preference model the disagreement points
correspond to the outcome that has the property that each of the parties is
indifferent between reaching this outcome now or reaching it at any future
time. In the exogenous-risk model the disagreement points correspond to the
outcome obtained in the event of a breakdown of the bargaining process.
19The results by Binmore et al. (1986) provide a guide for the application
of the Nash bargaining solution. In wage bargaining the central motive that
drives the bargaining parties to reach an agreement is probably time prefe-
rence. The relationship between the strategic and the axiomatic approach
suggests that the disagreement points in the Nash bargaining model should
be set equal to the parties' income streams during the dispute.
This interpretation of the disagreement points is used by Moene (1988) in
a study of the effect of different kinds of industrial action on the bargaining
outcome. He presents a time-preference model with several bargaining
rounds. In each round either the union or the firm proposes a wage rate and
the opposing party can accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected,
there is a conflict. The income streams of both parties during a conflict
depend on the kind of industrial action. The workers' income during a go-
slow action is assumed to be higher than their strike support. The
compensation given to the firm during a strike (e.g. by the employers'
organization) is supposed to be higher than the profit during a go-slow
action. The outcome of the strategic game is shown to be equal to the
solution of a Nash bargaining model in which the disagreement or threat
points are set equal to the parties' income streams during a conflict. By
choosing alternative disagreement points the effects of different kinds of
industrial action on the bargaining outcome are studied. If there is a strike
during a conflict, the bargaining process results in a higher employment
level and a lower wage rate than if there are go-slow actions. Which kind of
industrial action is used is determined either by law or by the credibility of
the threats.
3 Empirical research
The empirical research can be split into two parts. In the first part the
model of wage and employment determination is taken as given. The data
are used for different purposes, such as to reveal union preferences, to test
the empirical applicability of the model itself, or to draw inferences on the
implications of union wage setting. The second part concerns testing
between competing models of wage and employment determination,
especially between the labour demand curve model and the contract curve
model. The results of the first part are summarized in 3.1, the results of the
second part in 3.2.
3.1 Estimation results
The model which is estimated most often is the monopoly model. Some of
tfiese studies are based on micro-data, others on aggregate data. The aim of
the first group of studies is mainly to draw inferences on union preferences.
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The studies by Farber (1978a,b) seem to be the first empirical applications
of the monopoly model. Later, empirical work was done by Dertouzos and
Pencavel (1981), and Pencavel (1984a,b). The study of Carruth and Oswald
(1985) is the only one which is based on European micro data. As is clear
from table 1. Durdop's wage bill maximization hypothesis is decisively
rejected. Evidence on the rents of unionization hypothesis is too scarce to
draw a conclusion. The aim of the second group of studies is more diverse.
Pencavel (1985) finds that the parameter restrictions implied by the
monopoly model must be rejected against an unconstrained loglinear model.
A problem with this result, which is not unusual, is that the unconstrained
loglinear model is difficult to interpret theoretically. In a later study,
Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) conclude that hours of work play a role in
the union objective function which is distinct from earnings.
The right-to-manage model is firstly implemented by Nickel! and
Andrews (1983). According to Nickell and Andrews, this model is to be
preferred to the efficient bargain model, because firms find it advisable to
make continuous adjustments to their total level of employment. The
estimation results suggest that around 400,000 people in Britain are
unemployed due to the effect of unions on real wages. Hoel and Nymoen
(1988) use the framework of Nickell and Andrews to model the relationship
between real wages, unemployment and inflation. Instead of a natural
unemployment rate or NAIRU, they find that any constant unemployment
rate is compatible with a constant rate of inflation and a real wage growth
equal to productivity growth.
The efficient bargain model is used in empirical work by Svejnar (1986).
The bargaining process is modelled as an asymmetric Nash bargaining pro-
blem. The relative bargaining power of the union and the firm depends on
exogenous factors, such as the unemployment rate and the rate of change of
consumer prices. The estimates, based on time series data of U.S. industry,
support the view that exogenous changes in the bargaining environment
influence the outcome. The results also provide some indirect evidence that
bargaining outcomes are not on the labour demand curve, but on a vertical
contract curve. The model developed by Svejnar is estimated by Veugelers
(1989) using cross-section data of Belgian manufacturing. The empirical
results indicate that in the division of the price-cost margin unions gain less
than management. Product market concentration has a significant positive
impact on cross-industry variation of bargaining power, whereas
unemployment has an insignificant positive impact. The bargaining
outcomes are assumed to lie on a vertical contract curve a priori, so the
results cannot be interpreted as indirect evidence against the labour demand
curve model.
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Results of testing between the labour demand model and the efficient bar-
gain model are presented by Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Card (1986),
MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), Eberts and Stone (1986), Bean and Tumbull
(1988), Nickell and Wadhwani (1988) and Martinello (1989). All studies.
except two, are based on U.S. data. Due to differences in institutional
setting there clearly remains scope for empirical research in Europe.
The testing procedures centre around the specification of labour demand.
In the labour demand curve model the firm equates the value of marginal
productivity to the wage rate
/?'(/v>W. (20)
In the efficient bargain model the slope of the isoprofit curves and indif-
ference curves are equal. The contract curve can be described by (cf. 18)
(21)
The labour demand curve equation can be considered as a special case of
the contract curve equation, namely the case where the last term of (21) is
equal to zero. Notice that in the efficient bargain model the employment
level depends on the alternative wage rate \ whereas in the labour demand
curve model it does not. Brown and Ashenfelter, Card, Bean and Turnbull
and Nickell and Wadhwani exploit this fact to distinguish between both
models. MaCurdy and Pencavel allow for more factors of production and
test whether the ratio of marginal products equals the ratio of input prices.
Eberts and Stone introduce employment-security provisions which might
lead to wage-employment combinations off the labour demand curve. The
testing procedure seeks to ascertain whether the strength of these provisions
increases the gap between the wage rate and the value of marginal
productivity. Martinello, finally, proposes a non-nested testing procedure.
The empirical evidence, which is summarized in table 2, suggests that
wage-employment combinations off the labour demand curve are observed.
The results should be interpreted with care, however. Brown and
Ashenfelter get estimates which are either insignificant or of the wrong
sign. Card's model does not provide a credible interpretation of observed
movements in wages and employment. MaCurdy and Pencavel notice that
the test to discriminate between the labour demand curve model and the
efficient bargain model requires much more of the former than of the latter.
Employment depends on the alternative wage unless the argument B
vanishes in the ratio Gi(W,N;B)/G,(W.N;B).
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Hirsch and Addison (1986; p. 17) note that the results of Eberts and Stone
pertain to the public sector, which is not-for-profit. Therefore they are
reluctant to generalize the results to the private sector. Bean, Turnbull,
Nickell and Wadhwani argue that the results obtained may also be
explained by efficiency wage considerations; see chapter 4 for a review of
the efficiency wage theory. The testing results of Martinello are inconclu-
sive. Further, it should be noted that in most cases the labour demand curve
model is rejected, but the efficient bargain model remains untested. For
example, the fact that alternative wages play a role in the determination of
employment casts some doubt on the validity of the labour demand curve
model, but does not imply that the efficient bargain model is correct.
Although the performance of the labour demand curve model is unsatis-
fying, at this stage I am unwilling to reject it in favour of the efficient
bargain model.
There remains scope for improvement of the proposed testing procedures.
Firstly, most authors estimate a single equation, namely a labour demand
equation. A better approach is to estimate simultaneously a labour demand
equation and a wage equation to avoid identification problems. Secondly,
the testing procedures are based on static theoretical models, whereas labour
demand is highly dynamic; an exception is the model by Card (1986). For
example, it can be assumed that unions aim at maximizing the discounted
value of some utility function. This would imply that unions aim at reaching
an optimal utility path instead of a discrete point as in the static case.
Problems of credibility and reputation may be integrated in such a dynamic
analysis. Further, there remains scope for empirical work based on other
data sets. At the moment it is unclear whether the empirical results, which
are nearly all based on data from the U.S., are valid in other countries as
well. Unlike the U.S., wage bargaining in countries such as Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands often
takes place at sectoral and/or national level. In this situation it seems
unlikely that a union is able to enforce employment levels that deviate from
firms' labour demand curves. Additional evidence for the relevance of the
bargaining environment is provided by Calmfors and Driffill (1988),
Freeman (1988) and Layard (1989). They show that differences in
employment records may be related to the bargaining environment.
Therefore, empirical evidence from the U.S. in favour of the efficient
bargain model cannot be generalized to Western Europe.
A test of the seniority or flat indifference curve (FIC) model against the
monopoly union and efficient bargain model is provided by Carruth et al.
(1986). The idea behind the test is as follows. In both the monopoly and
efficient bargain frameworks the union's utility depends on employment. In
the FIC model, however, the trade union is not concerned with the utility of
the unemployed and should therefore not react to a rise or fall in those
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27variables which affect an unemployed person's welfare. The level of utility
of union members who lose their jobs is unobserved. The unemployment
benefit and aggregate British unemployment are used as a proxy. If the
unemployment benefit and aggregate level of unemployment can be shown
to have no influence on pay and the level of jobs, this should count as
evidence in favour of the FIC model. The data consist of annual
observations of the British mining industry and the British steel industry
over the post-war period. The results imply that the FIC model must be
rejected. This concludes our review of the empirical evidence on union
wage setting and employment.
4 Concluding remarks
Evaluating the state of the art, the integration of trade union behaviour into
economic theory has made clear that wage rates are not determined by
perfect competition. Nevertheless, there remains much to be explained.
Firstly, dynamics of union wage setting have been nearly neglected so far.
Exceptions include Kidd and Oswald (1987), Driffill (1985), Van der Ploeg
(1987) and Lock wood and Manning (1989). Secondly, long-term analysis
with endogenous investment requires more attention. Thirdly, the
relationship between union wage formation theory and competing theories
of wage and employment determination, such as insider-outsider theory and
efficiency wage theory, is not clear. A problem to discriminate empirically
between the competing theories is that they give rise to more or less similar
regression equations; cf. the discussion in Layard and Nickell (1985, 1986).
Another problem is that relatively short time series of aggregate data often
do not "deliver unambiguous answers to the sort of questions economists
ask of them" (Pencavel (1989), p. 32). Hopefully, the use of micro-data, as
in Nickell and Wadhwani (1988), or the use of aggregate data of several
countries helps to answer these questions. The relationship between the
theories can also be investigated by combining them. The interaction
between insider-outsider and efficiency wage effects is studied in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 presents an integration of trade union theory and efficiency wage
theory via contract wages and wage drift. Insider-outsider effects in union
wage formation are discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Before, an empirical
application of union wage formation theory is presented in chapter 3.
28Union wage formation and unemployment
in the Netherlands (1965-1987)
Abstract
This chapter presents an empirical model of union wage forma-
tion and employment. The (Stackelberg) equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is shown to be a function of taxes, the replacement
ratio, the gap between consumer and producer prices, produc-
tivity effects, and the rate of long-term unemployment. The
model is estimated with aggregate data of the private sector in
the Netherlands (1965-1987). The results suggest that the
equilibrium unemployment rate is pushed upwards by taxes, the
replacement ratio and by the gap between consumer and pro-
ducer prices, and is reduced by productivity effects. Insider-
outsider effects appear insignificant.
291 Introduction
During the nineteen eighties. Western Europe suffered from persistently
high unemployment rates. One explanation for this phenomenon, as sug-
gested by Layard and Nickell (1985, 1986, 1987), is that several factors,
such as taxes and terms of trade effects, have pushed up wages above the
market clearing level. In other words, changes in the natural rate or NAIRU
are attributed to these 'push' factors. An alternative explanation, as pro-
posed by Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 1987a, 1988), Solow (1985), and
Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987), is that wage determination is domi-
nated by employed insiders, who do not care about unemployed outsiders.
These explanations are fruitfully combined in an empirical study of wage
determination in the U.K. by Nickell (1987).
This chapter presents an application of the theory of union wage forma-
tion, summarized in chapter 2, to explain equilibrium unemployment. The
model of union wage formation and labour demand (which is assumed to be
equal to employment) integrates the push factors and the insider-outsider
effects mentioned above. The equilibrium unemployment rate is shown to
be a function of tax rates, the replacement ratio, the gap between consumer
and producer prices, productivity effects, and insider-outsider effects. The
model is estimated with aggregate annual data of the private sector in the
Netherlands (1965-1987).
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 2 presents some data
to give an impression of the economic situation in the Netherlands. The
empirical model is derived in section 3. The data and estimation results are
described in section 4. Section 5 provides a decomposition of changes in the
equilibrium unemployment rate. A summary and suggestions for further
research are offered in section 5.
2 Economic situation in the Netherlands
During the nineteen eighties, the Netherlands was among the countries with
the highest unemployment rate in the E.C.. As is illustrated in figure 1,
from 1965 until 1971 unemployment was below 2.2 per cent. Between 1971
and 1975 unemployment rose to some 5 or 6 per cent, where it remained
until 1979. Between 1980 and 1983 unemployment increased sharply from 6
per cent to 15 per cent. In the second half of the nineteen eighties, unem-
ployment slowly diminished. The long-term (over one year) unemployment
rate was below 0.4 per cent from 1965 until 1974. In the second half of the
nineteen seventies, it was little above 1 per cent. Between 1981 and 1984,
the long-term unemployment rate rose from 1.6 per cent to 8.4 per cent. In
the second half of the nineteen eighties, the long-term unemployment rate
30m (/9Ó5-/9S7)
D unemployment + long-temt unemployment
Figure I Unemployment and long-term unemployment
D employers' taxes + employees' taxes
Figure 2 Taxes and benefits
• benefits
Cl consumer price + producer price
Figure 3 Consumer and producer prices
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price gapslowly diminished. Note that since 1984 the share of long-term unemployed
in total unemployment is above 50 per cent.
Turning to the 'push' factors, figure 2 illustrates the increase in the
employers' and employees' rate of taxes and social security contributions
and the replacement ratio. The rate of employers' contributions rose from
14 per cent in 1965 to 22 per cent in the late nineteen eighties. The
employees' tax rate increased from 15 per cent in 1951 to 33 per cent in
1983. The replacement ratio grew as well, from 60 per cent in 1965 to 75
per cent in 1975. It remained at this level until 1983, after which it
diminished to 69 per cent in 1987. Besides the enormous increase in tax
burden, a considerable gap has arisen between consumer prices and pro-
ducer (value added) prices. Setting both the consumer price index and the
producer price index of 1965 equal to 1, figure 3 shows that the relative
change of consumer prices vis-a-vis producer prices has been about 20 per
cent between 1965 and the mid nineteen eighties. Especially between 1973
and 1981 the gap has widened considerably: from 7 per cent in 1973 to 20
percent in 1981.
Union membership has decreased from some 40 per cent in the fifties,
sixties and seventies to 29 per cent in 1987 (source: CBS (1987)). Despite
the reduction in membership, the effect of trade unions on wage determina-
tion is still strong. The reasons are, firstly, that unions are authorized by law
to represent workers and, secondly, that union contracts apply to nonmem-
bers as well. The result is that around 80 per cent of the employees is
covered by a collective wage agreement. The assumption, which is maintai-
ned in this chapter, that wage rates in the private sector are determined by
one trade union is of course a simplification. Despite some coordination by
confederations of trade unions, there are differences between sectors. Note
that also the phenomenon of wage drift is neglected in this chapter. Let us
turn to the derivation of the empirical model.
3 Model
The model of union wage formation and labour demand is based on the
monopoly union model, which is discussed in section 2.2. An alternative
possibility is to assume that the union and the firm bargain about the wage
rate, as in the right-to-manage model; this model is discussed in section 2.2
as well. The reason that this model is not chosen is, firstly, that the first-
order condition cannot explicitly be solved for the wage rate (cf. De Bruyne
and Van Rompuy (1990)) and, secondly, that it is difficult to make the
theoretical concept bargaining power operational. Fortunately, there appears
to be little difference between the wage equation derived from the mono-
poly union model and the one derived from the right-to-manage model. A
third possibility is to assume that the wage employment outcome is on a
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contract curve, as in the efficient bargain model; cf. section 2.2. Since
bargaining about employment is rare in the Netherlands, this does not seem
realistic. In the monopoly model, the union sets the wage rate taking into
account the trade-off between the wage rate and the employment level as
specified by the firm's labour demand curve. The equilibrium is of the
Stackelberg type, where the union acts as leader and the firm as follower.
The wage employment outcome is always on the labour demand curve. The
outcome is an equilibrium in the sense that it does not pay the firm to
deviate by choosing an employment level which is not the corresponding
point on the labour demand curve. ' It is assumed that the union and the
firm take the price level as given.
Let the representative firm's technology be represented by a constant
returns to scale production function of the CES type.
where Y, K and N denote value-added output, capital stock and employ-
ment, respectively. Capital-augmenting and labour-augmenting technical
progress are captured by (l+a^)' and (1+0CN)', respectively, where t is a time
index. The parameter p is related to the elasticity of factor substitution by
O=l/(l-p)>0. The firm is assumed to maximize its short-run profits taking
the output price and the wage rate as given. The capital stock is predeter-
mined.




where n denotes profits, P the price level and W the wage rate (including
employers' and employees' taxes and social security contributions).
Throughout this chapter wages and profits are defined in nominal terms. As
first-order condition one obtains the marginal productivity condition (taking
logarithms)
+(p-l)lnJV-ln(W7/>)=0.
There results no equilibrium if the firm acts as Stackelberg leader and
the union as follower. If the firm sets the employment level, the union can
obtain a higher utility by setting the wage rate higher than indicated by the
labour demand curve.
33Combining the marginal productivity condition with the production function
gives the labour demand equation (lower case letters denote natural
logarithms, unless otherwise stated)
o(w-p)+;y, (4)
where ln(l+a„) is approximated as ct^ and where a„ denotes lnA„.
Let the representative union's preferences be represented by a utility
function G(W,N). The union is supposed to maximize its utility subject to
the firm's labour demand function (because output is endogenous, (3) is
used as constraint instead of (4)), taking the price level as given
max
s.t. (3).
The first-order conditions for a maximum, combined with the production
function (1) and the marginal productivity condition (3), give the wage
equation (in logs)
l-O- (6)
The utility function I propose is a generalization of G=WN*\ which is
proposed by Nickell and Andrews (1983). Assuming that the weight the
union attaches to employment depends positively on the aggregate unem-
ployment rate (u) possibly corrected for long-term unemployment (ul) and
negatively on the replacement ratio (b), union preferences are represented
by
The union is supposed to take the aggregate unemployment rate and the
replacement ratio as given. Using (7), the wage equation becomes
(8)
The wage rates in the data-set include employers' and employees' taxes and
social security payments. It seems reasonable to assume that the union is
unwilling to accept a lower net wage if employers' taxes are increased.
Possibly also a higher gross wage rate is demanded if the employees' taxes
are increased. Note that the relationship between the gross wage rate
(including both employers' and employees' taxes) (WJ and the net wage
rate (W„) is given by W,(l-s,)(l-Si)=W„. where s, and s^ denote the
employers' and employees' tax rate, respectively. Taking logs and rearrang-
ing gives w,»w,-ln(l-s,)-ln(l-Si). Therefore, the wage equation is augmented/n /Ae /vW/rcr/amft f/965-/957)
with the terms -ln(l-s,) and -ln(l-s,). The former's coefficient should be
close to 1, the latter's coefficient somewhere between 0 and 1. At the outset
it is not clear whether the union uses a consumer or producer price deflator.
Therefore, the wage rate is allowed to increase with the gap between
consumer prices and producer prices, p^-p. Somewhat linearizing (8) and
including the terms discussed leads to the following wage equation
Aggregating over all firms leads to an identical labour demand equation
(4) and an identical wage equation (9), except that output and employment
are replaced by their aggregate values. Apologizing for the abuse of nota-
tion, let y and n denote aggregate values from now on. Combining the
aggregate employment equation (4) and the aggregate wage equation (9)
gives the aggregate unemployment rate equation
(10)
where Y7=(-aN+Yo)/Y5- From (10) it is easily seen that the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate is not independent of labour productivity. In this respect the
model differs from the model by Layard and Nickell (1986), who assume
that this independence does hold.
If the production technology can be described by a Cobb Douglas
function, which is a special case of the CES function, it is easy to show that




Drawing these two curves in the (w+n-p-y,u) space, equation (11) gives a
horizontal labour demand curve, whereas equation (12) gives a downward-
sloping wage demand curve. The intersection of the two curves gives the
equilibrium share of labour in value added and the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate. * The Stackelberg equilibrium is stable unless the follower wants
to act as a leader.
If the production process cannot be described by a Cobb Douglas
function it is more difficult to illustrate the equilibrium graphically, because
the productivity terms in (4) and (9) are different.
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The empirical model is based on the labour demand equation (4) and the
wage equation (9). The unemployment equation (10) is not included in the
estimation procedure to avoid singularity problems. In the real world, labour
demand and wage rate cannot instantaneously be adjusted due to adjustment
costs or to long-term contracts. Therefore some form of dynamics is
required in the equations for empirical work. Assume that actual labour
demand and wage rate follow a second-order partial adjustment process
(AR2) to the equilibrium values as derived above. Then the empirical model




The vector of error terms e'=(e,,ej) is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed over time. The vector is assumed to have zero mean;
the contemporaneously covariance matrix is finite. In the wage equation,
prices are lagged half a year corresponding to wage indexation clauses.
Unemployment in the wage equation is lagged one year. This concludes the
modifications for empirical work.
4 Empirical results
The data consist of annual observations of the private sector in the Nether-
lands (1965-1987) and are obtained from the Central Planning Bureau.
Earlier data on the replacement ratio are not available. Note that the output
level and (possibly) the price level are endogenous. To avoid simultaneity
bias, the parameters are estimated by 3SLS, using exogenous and lagged
endogenous variables as instruments for y and p. The results are reported in
table 1.
In the labour demand equation, the parameter estimates imply a short-run
real wage elasticity (taken positively) of 0.21, which is between the estimate
by Bean et al. (1986) for the Netherlands (0.11), and the estimate by Layard
and NickeU (1986) for the U.K. (1954-1983), namely 0.29. The long-run
real wage elasticity (which is also the elasticity of factor substitution) of
0.65 is smaller than that obtained by Bean et al. (1.15), but close to the
36(79Ó5-79S7)








































































a The data consist of annual observations of the private sector in
Netherlands (1965-1987); source: Central Planning Bureau, The Hague,
b Estimation is carried out by the iterative 3SLS routine of TSP 4.1.
c Unless otherwise stated, standard errors are given in parentheses.
the
37estimates by Layard and Nickell (0.68) and by Graafland (1989) for six
E.C.-countries (1962-1985), namely 0.63. CED (1987) cites evidence that a
value of 0.5 is a reasonable estimate for the Netherlands and the OECD for
the short run and a value between 0.5 and 1.0 for the long run. The rate of
labour augmenting technical progress is estimated at nearly 3.3 per cent,
which is close to the estimate of Graafland.
Turning to the wage equation, the unrestricted estimate of the long-term
employers' tax rate coefficient exceeds unity. In line with the theoretical
model the coefficient is restricted to unity. Empirically this restriction is
easily accepted (t=O.72). The employees' tax rate coefficient is estimated at
nearly 0.28, but is not significantly different from 0. This suggests that
mainly employers' taxes increase wages. Graafland obtained an overall
estimate of 0.34. The coefficient of the discrepancy between the consumer
and the producer price level is estimated at 0.57, which implies that the
wage rate is fully corrected for changes in producer prices (by assumption)
and only partly compensated for the additional change in the consumer
price level. Note that this estimate is below one, as it sometimes is assumed
to be. Layard and Nickell find an estimate of around 0.5 for the gap
between import prices and value added prices. The unemployment elasticity
of the wage rate is 1.50, which is smaller than the estimate of Layard and
Nickell (2.47), who use the short-run unemployment rate as explanatory
variable. Graafland uses a hysteresis model and finds 1.79(u.,-0.86u_2). The
long-term unemployment rate (besides the total unemployment rate)
appeared insignificant (t=O.43) and is omitted. This suggests that insider-
outsider effects in union wage setting are not significant.
Summarizing, the parameter estimates satisfy the restrictions as derived in
the theoretical analysis and are largely in line with earlier studies.
5 Unemployment accounting
The estimated model can be used to compute the long-run equilibrium
unemployment rate. Firstly, the long-run versions of the labour demand and
wage equation are taken by setting the adjustment parameters (y,,, y,j, y^i
and Y22) of equations (13) and (14) equal to zero. By combining the long-
run versions of these equations one obtains the following equation for the
long-run equilibrium unemployment rate
X ,Y> ^
(15)
Estimates of the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate are found by
substituting the parameter estimates and the observations. As can be seen
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Figure 4 Equilibrium unemployment
from figure 4, the equilibrium unemployment rate slightly overstates the
observed unemployment rate in the period 1965-1982 and underestimates it
somewhat in the period 1983-1986. Overall, the actual unemployment rate
lags somewhat behind the equilibrium unemployment rate. This lag is
probably caused by adjustment costs of labour and long-term wage con-
tracts.
Other reasons which might explain the discrepancy between the observed
and the equilibrium unemployment rate include the following. Firstly, the
discrepancy might be due to short-run aggregate demand effects, which
have been neglected. Secondly, working with aggregate data requires many
simplifying assumptions which do not allow differences in developments
between sectors. Finally, there are some problems with the accuracy of the
unemployment data.
Changes in the equilibrium unemployment rate can be attributed to
changes in tax rates, in the replacement ratio, in the gap between consumer
and producer prices and in labour productivity. Taking first differences in
(15) gives
(16)
From table 2 it is clear that taxes, the replacement ratio and the gap
between consumer and producer prices have pushed up equilibrium unem-
ployment, while labour productivity (more precisely, the gap between
average and marginal labour productivity) has reduced it. Employers' taxes
had their greatest impact in the late sixties and in the early seventies, while
their effect diminished in the eighties. Employees' taxes and the gap



































































between consumer and producer prices mostly contributed to equilibrium
unemployment in the early seventies and in the early eighties. The increase
in the replacement ratio pushed up unemployment in the early seventies.
During the late sixties and early seventies these effects were partly compen-
sated by productivity effects. In the early eighties the slow-down in labour
productivity growth caused an increase of equilibrium unemployment.
Comparing the period 1965-1968 with 1985-1987, the equilibrium rate
rose by nearly 9 per cent. This was due to an employers' tax effect of 5.2
per cent, an employees' tax effect of 3.7 per cent, a replacement ratio effect
of 1.0 per cent, a consumer price effect of 6.7 per cent, and a productivity
effect of -7.7 per cent. The actual rate increased 12.7 per cent between the
periods 1965-1968 and 1985-1987.
6 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents a model of labour demand and union wage setting.
The (Stackelberg) equilibrium unemployment rate is shown to be a function
of the employers' and the employees' tax rate, the replacement ratio, the
gap between consumer and producer prices, productivity effects and insider-
outsider effects. The empirical application to data of the Dutch private
sector (1965-1987) suggests that the increase in the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is due to the rise of the tax rates and of the replacement ratio and
to the widening gap between consumer and producer prices. Productivity
effects seem to have reduced the equilibrium unemployment rate, while
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insider-outsider effects appear insignificant. Of course, these results should
be interpreted with care. The standard errors of the estimates are relatively
large, which means that the decomposition of changes in the equilibrium
unemployment rate is not very precise. Nevertheless, the analysis provides
some insight in the causes of unemployment.
The presented model can be improved and extended in several ways.
Firstly, attention should be paid to short-run aggregate demand effects.
Secondly, the model should include utilisation rates and inventories. Third-
ly, the dynamics of the model should not be introduced ad hoc, but theoreti-
cally explained from adjustment costs. Fourthly, by modelling the output





N total employment excluding government employment in labour
years corrected for changes in hours worked per week and for
changes in days worked per year.
Y value added output enterprise sector excluding natural gas and
housing, factor costs, prices 1980.
W wage rate, including taxes and social security contributions
corrected for changes in hours worked per week and for
changes in days worked per year.
P value added price index.
P, consumer price index.
U number of unemployed, registered at labour office, including
nonregistered 57.5-65 years.
M labour supply (M=U+N).
u unemployment rate (u=U/(M+E)) \
ul long-term unemployment rate (over one year).
S| employers' tax rate.
Sj employees' tax rate, constructed as in Graafland (1988), p. 519.
b replacement ratio.
In accounting the unemployment rate the denominator includes also
government employment, because intuitively the resulting rate seems most
important in wage setting.
424 Efficiency wages and unemployment
Abstract
This chapter considers whether efficiency wages can explain
unemployment. Further it presents a new result on the inter-
action between insider-outsider and efficiency wage effects.
Theoretically the efficiency wage hypothesis that high wages
improve productivity may explain natural or structural unem-
ployment. However, more complex contracts may improve
worker productivity without causing unemployment. Further,
efficiency wages do not cause unemployment if there is a
competitive secondary sector. The empirical evidence provides
some support for the hypothesized wage-productivity relation-
ship, but does not establish whether efficiency wages cause
unemployment. Finally, insider-outsider and efficiency wage
effects appear to reinforce one another.
431 Introduction
The high rates of unemployment in Western Europe in the 1980's raise the
question why wage rates do not always adjust to equalize demand and
supply in the labour market, as the neoclassical perfect competition model
suggests. Keynesian theory argues that unemployment is due to shortage of
effective demand, assuming nominal wages are sticky. Unfortunately, the
theory does not justify this assumption in a satisfactory way. The efficiency
wage theory argues that real wages are sticky and that involuntary
unemployment is an equilibrium phenomenon. The basic hypothesis of the
efficiency wage theory is that it is not profitable for the firm to reduce the
wage rate, because this would reduce the workers' effort or the applicants'
ability (more shortly, workers' productivity). The rationales for the
relationship between the wage rate and workers' effort include shirking,
labour turnover and sociological motives; the rationale for the relationship
between the wage rate and the applicants' ability is adverse selection.
Besides providing an explanation for unemployment, the efficiency wage
theory also implies that wages for identical workers may differ between
firms due to different wage-productivity relationships. Critics have argued
that there are more profitable ways than paying efficiency wages to make
workers productive, such as the posting of performance bonds or the use of
steep age-earnings profiles. The empirical evidence, although scarce,
provides some support for the hypotheses that high wages reduce shirking
and labour turnover and increase productivity. Further, there is some
evidence that wages for identical workers differ between industries. The
empirical evidence is too limited to conclude that efficiency wages cause
unemployment.
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to consider whether the efficiency
wage theory provides an explanation for unemployment. Secondly, to
examine its relationship with two alternative theories of wage formation and
(unemployment, namely the union bargaining theory and the insider-
outsider theory. Thirdly, to evaluate the empirical evidence on efficiency
wages. Before, the efficiency wage theory has been reviewed by Yellen
(1984), Stiglitz (1986, 1987), Katz (1986), Carmichael (1990) and Teulings
and Webbink (1992). The early reviews do not contain recent empirical
work. None of these papers considers the relationship between efficiency
wage theory on the one hand and union bargaining theory and insider-
outsider theory on the other.
The set-up of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
efficiency wage theory and considers whether it can explain unemployment.
Section 3 deals with the relationship between union bargaining and
efficiency wages. The interaction between insider-outsider and efficiency
44wage effects is considered in section 4. The empirical evidence is
summarized in section 5. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
2 Theory of efficiency wages
2.1 Basic idea of the efficiency wage theory
The efficiency wage theory is based on three assumptions:
(i) the worker's productivity, (e) increases with the firm's real wage rate
(W), but in the relevant range at a decreasing rate: e=e(W) for W£0, e(0)<0,
e'>0, e"<0. The restriction e(0)<0 is sufficient to prevent the firm from
obtaining infinite effort per dollar by setting the wage equal to zero. The
assumption e"<0 is made to satisfy the second-order condition for a
maximum in the firm's profit maximization problem which is defined
below.
(ii) the profit-maximizing firm has imperfect information about the
individual worker's effort; therefore, the effort level cannot form an
enforceable clause of a contract. If assumption (ii) were not satisfied, the
firm would set the productivity level such that the worker is indifferent to
either working in the firm or being unemployed (or working elsewhere). In
other words, without assumption (ii) there would be no involuntary
unemployment.
(iii) more profitable ways to maintain productivity do not exist.
Under these three assumptions it may be profitable for the firm to raise the
wage rate above the market-clearing level, because the returns from
increased productivity may more than outweigh the increase of labour costs.
Throughout this chapter the wage rate and the firm's profits are defined in
real terms. The output price of the representative firm is assumed to be
equal to the aggregate price level. As the aggregate price level is taken as
given, the distinction between nominal and real wage rates is not too
important.
The efficiency wage theory can be formalized as follows. The firm
maximizes its profits by setting the wage rate and the employment level (N)
max fl(WA)=/V(e(HON)-WA/. (1)
The symbol A denotes the productivity shifter, alternatively, it can be
interpreted as the firm's output price (defined in real terms). The symbol f
denotes the production function, which is increasing (f >0) at a decreasing
rate (f'<0) in labour inputs eN. Assuming an interior solution the first-order
conditions for a maximum are
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Combining these equations yields
gL (4,
Equation (4), which is known as the Solow condition, says that in the
optimum the elasticity of productivity with respect to the wage rate equals
unity; see Solow (1979). As it stands, the Solow condition implies that the
wage rate is unaffected by changes in the firm's relative output price or by
labour productivity shocks. However, this result does not hold in more
complex efficiency wage models. For example, the firm may take the
employment level as given in the short run. It can maximize short-run
profits by setting the wage rate according to (2). In general, the short-run
wage rate depends on the firm's relative output price or on labour
productivity shocks. Alternatively, if worker's productivity depends on the
ratio of wages to profits, in other words, if workers want a fair share of
value added, than even under efficiency wage considerations the wage rate
may depend on output prices and productivity. An implicit assumption of
the optimization problem is that the optimal wage rate is high enough to
attract workers; in other words, the wage must exceed the market-clearing
wage. It is easy to show that if the wage-productivity elasticity at the
market-clearing wage is less than or equal to one, it is optimal for the firm
to pay the market-clearing wage. In other words, if the incentive effect is
not strong enough, the firm will not pay an efficiency wage.
The rest of this section deals with the following issues. The rationales
behind the hypothesized wage-productivity relationship are considered in
2.2. The implications of the relationship with respect to wage rigidity,
unemployment, wage differentials, unemployment patterns and labour
productivity are discussed in 2.3. The question whether efficiency wage
models explain unemployment is more extensively considered in 2.4.
2.2 Rationales for the wage-productivity relationship
The idea that higher wage rates improve productivity was first proposed by
Leibenstein (1957). He argued that in developing countries a higher wage
rate enables better nutrition, which leads to higher productivity. In
developed countries four other rationales for the wage-productivity
relationship are relevant. Three rationales, which are formalized in the
shirking model, the labour turnover model and the sociological models,
establish a positive relationship between the wage rate and the workers'
effort. The fourth rationale, which is formalized in the adverse selection
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model, results in a positive relationship between the firm's wage rate and
the applicants' ability.
The shirking model
One rationale for the wage-productivity relationship is provided by the
shirking model which is proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); see also
Foster and Wan (1984). The worker is assumed to dislike effort and to
maximize his utility by choosing either to work or to shirk. The firm
monitors its workers imperfectly. If a worker is caught shirking, he is fired.
Suppose that the wage rate is such that the labour market clears. If a worker
is caught shirking, he can immediately find another job at the same wage.
Therefore, it is optimal for the worker to shirk. The firm raises its wage rate
in order to make it attractive for workers to stay and to be found non-
shirking. If all firms do so, the initial incentive effect disappears. However,
labour demand is reduced by increasing the wage rate. For this reason a
worker who is fired faces the probability of remaining unemployed for
some time. If this is unattractive enough, the worker will not take the risk
to be caught shirking.
The labour turnover model
A second rationale for the wage-productivity relationship is given by the
labour turnover model by Salop (1979). In this model workers are
heterogeneous with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics of the jobs
offered by a firm. The workers do not know these characteristics in
advance, but learn them on the job. If a worker is dissatisfied and believes
other firms offer more attractive jobs, he quits and joins the unemployment
pool to search for another job. On-the-job search is ruled out by
assumption. Labour turnover involves hiring and training costs to the firm.
In order to keep turnover low, the firm tries to pay a wage rate which is
high relative to the wage paid by other firms. If all firms behave the same,
the relative wage remains constant. However, a high wage rate keeps labour
demand low and possibly labour supply high. Thus, unemployment results.
Unemployment makes it costly for workers to quit. In equilibrium the
profit-maximizing firm sets the wage rate such that the wage costs of
increasing the wage rate are equal to the reduction of training costs. Note
that the structures of the labour turnover model and the shirking model are
similar. Whereas in the shirking model unemployment prevents the worker
from cheating, in the turnover model it prevents the worker from quitting.
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Sociological models
The third rationale for the wage-productivity relationship is proposed by
Akerlof (1982, 1984). He argues that for psychological and sociological
reasons a high wage rate increases effort by improving workers' morale or
by raising group work norms. The idea behind his so-called gift exchange
model is that workers feel obliged to be productive as a gift in return for
the firm's high wage rate. The justification for this relationship offered in
these papers remains somewhat fragile. In a later paper Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) propose a fair wage-effort relationship which expresses that workers
reduce effort below the normal level if the firm's wage is below the 'fair'
wage. This relationship is more convincingly defended by referring to
equity theory, relative deprivation theory and social exchange theory. If the
incentive effect is strong enough, the profit-maximizing firm sets the wage
rate above the market-clearing level.
The idea that workers care about relative wages is generally accepted.
However, a problem with the gift exchange or the fair wage approach is
that the determination of the fair wage rate and of the normal effort level
remains largely unexplained. Whereas these variables play an important role
in the model, the results become sensitive to changes in the assumptions. In
the words of Carmichael (1990), "the theory is dissatisfying because it has
such a short distance between its assumptions and its conclusions" (p. 291).
Until the problem of modelling the fair wage rate is solved, it is also
difficult to test the approach empirically.
The adverse selection model
The adverse selection model, which is found in Weiss (1980, 1991) and
Malcomson (1981), provides the fourth rationale for the wage-productivity
relationship. In this model workers are assumed to be heterogeneous in
ability and their productivity is assumed to be related to their ability. The
model further assumes that workers with a higher ability have a higher
reservation wage, e.g. because they can earn more in self-employment. If
the firm has imperfect information with respect to the applicants' ability, it
may be profitable to pay more than the market-clearing wage to increase the
average ability of the attracted pool of applicants. Suppose an unemployed
worker offers to work for less than the firm's optimal wage rate. Then the
firm will not accept the offer, because the offer itself reveals that the
worker cannot be very productive. Unemployed workers whose reservation
wage is below the optimal wage rate are involuntary unemployed, the others
are voluntary unemployed.
It should be noted that Weiss' assumption that the minimization of labour
costs has a unique (interior) solution is quite strong. The assumption implies
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serious constraints on the distribution of abilities and on the relationship
between ability and the reservation rate. ' Unfortunately, Weiss does not
say anything about the restrictions which are necessary to avoid comer
solutions and which are sufficient to satisfy the second-order conditions.
2.3 Implications of the wage-productivity relationship
The implications of the hypothesized wage-productivity relationship differ
from those of the perfect competition model. This subsection considers the
implications of the efficiency wage hypothesis with respect to wages,
unemployment, wage differentials, unemployment patterns and labour
productivity.
One implication of the hypothesized wage-productivity relationship is that
real wages become sticky. The reason is that the equilibrium real wage rate
is only indirectly affected by the business cycle. This is most easily seen for
the shirking model and the labour turnover model. Changes in nominal
variables such as prices have no direct impact on the equilibrium real wage
rate. Only if the unemployment rate is affected by the business cycle, the
real wage rate adjusts.
A second implication of the wage-productivity relationship is that
unemployment may be an equilibrium phenomenon. Stiglitz (1987) calls this
'the repeal of the law of demand and supply'. The equilibrium concept
which is used here is that it is not optimal for any agent to change his
behaviour. The unemployment is involuntary because unemployed workers
strictly prefer to work at the going wage rate rather than being unemployed,
but firms have no incentive to hire them (at that wage) or to lower wages.
An intuitive explanation why the wage-productivity relationship may cause
unemployment is that the wage rate cannot equalize labour demand and
labour supply any more if it becomes an instrument to make the worker
productive. As in most simple efficiency wage models the aggregate supply
curve is vertical, the equilibrium unemployment rate is independent of the
business cycle. In other words, the efficiency wage models provide an
explanation for natural or structural unemployment. The issue whether the
efficiency wage theory can explain unemployment is further discussed in
2.4.
' In order to illustrate this, consider the following example which is
based on the model in Weiss (1980). Let the relationship between ability (6)
and the reservation wage be proportionate: 0=g(W)=W. Let the distribution of
abilities (F) be uniform over the interval [R.S], R>0. In other words,
F(0)=(W-R)/(S-R) for R<W<S. Then the firm's profit-maximizing wage rate
is R, which is not an interior solution.
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A third implication of the wage-productivity relationship is that multiple
wage equilibria may occur. Stiglitz (1987) calls this phenomenon 'the repeal
of the law of a single price'. Multiple wage equilibria can arise if the wage-
productivity relationship differs between firms. This seems a plausible
assumption, because monitoring problems are probably more prevalent in
large firms than in small firms, whereas turnover costs are higher in firms
whose production processes require more investment in firm-specific human
capital. Different wage-productivity relationships can easily lead to wage
differentials between firms or industries for identical workers. Multiple
wage equilibria may also occur when the costs per effective unit of labour
are not monotonie.
A fourth implication of the wage-productivity relationship is that it can
result in different unemployment patterns (and wage differentials) for
different types of workers. For example, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume
that there are two types of workers, say skilled and unskilled workers. The
fair wage is assumed to be a weighted average of the market-clearing wage
and the wage of other workers in the same firm. In equilibrium the skilled
workers obtain the market-clearing wage, which exceeds their fair wage.
The unskilled workers obtain their fair wage, which exceeds their market-
clearing wage. Consequently, all skilled workers are hired, but some
unskilled workers remain unemployed. Note that this result depends
crucially on the assumption that the fair wage of the skilled workers is
below their market-clearing wage due to the impact of the lower wage of
the unskilled workers. In fact, the assumption is inconsistent with the
observation by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) that in comparing wages "those
people who receive less are of comparatively little interest ...; whereas those
people who are paid more are of considerable interest" (p. 259).
A fifth implication of the wage-productivity relationship is that labour
productivity is procyclical. This is most easily seen in the shirking and the
labour turnover model. If the unemployment rate rises, workers are less
likely to shirk or to quit voluntarily. This implication is not in line with
Okun's law, which says that observed labour productivity is countercyclical.
Akerlof and Yellen (1986, pp. 11-14) argue that the problem can be solved
by combining efficiency wages with implicit contracts. Further, it should be
noted that Okun's law is not undisputed. For example, Wadhwani and Wall
(1988) suggest that the aggregate evidence on Okun's law is not very
reliable. For these reasons the productivity implications should not be
interpreted as strong evidence against the efficiency wage theory.
2.4 Efficiency wages and unemployment
As set out above the efficiency wage theory provides an explanation for
natural or structural unemployment. This subsection discusses two
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extensions of the standard efficiency wage models to explain cyclical
unemployment and unemployment persistence. It further considers two
objections against the efficiency wage explanation of unemployment.
The standard efficiency wage models can be extended to explain the
cyclical variation in unemployment. To do so, one must additionally assume
that changing the wage rate is costly to the firm. The costs of changing
wages (or prices) are called menu costs. Akerlof and Yellen (1985) show
that by combining efficiency wage determination with small menu costs
nominal wages become sticky. If wages do not adjust, then nominal shocks
lead to alterations in the level of employment. So, the efficiency wage
theory combined with menu costs can explain why unemployment varies
over the business cycle. Whereas Akerlof and Yellen argue that small
shocks can lead to large fluctuations in output and employment. Ball and
Romer (1989) show that the average impact is only small. The reason is
that under sticky wages (or prices) the positive and negative impact of
shocks on employment nearly cancel out.
The standard efficiency wage models can also be extended to explain the
persistence of unemployment. This can easily be shown in the context of
the fair wage model by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). It seems reasonable to
assume that workers' wage norms adapt to current and past experience.
After an adverse supply shock, such as a fall in labour productivity or an
adverse shift in the terms of trade, the firm will not reduce the wage rate
below the workers' wage norm in order to prevent the workers from
reducing effort. Probably, this results in a rise of unemployment.
Unemployment remains high until the wage norms are adjusted. A
formalization of this kind of model is presented by Layard et al. (1991, p.
169).
A first objection against the efficiency wage explanation of
unemployment is that more profitable contracts may be devised which raise
worker productivity without causing unemployment. In other words, the
objection is that assumption (iii) is incorrect. To avoid shirking the firm can
require the posting of a performance bond which is forfeited if the worker
is caught cheating. Similarly, to reduce labour turnover the firm can charge
application fees to compensate the hiring and training costs. The fact that
performance bonds or application fees are seldom observed in practice does
not matter, because the strategy can be implemented more subtly. To avoid
shirking the firm can defer payment by paying less than the value of
marginal productivity to young workers and by paying more than the value
of marginal productivity to older workers or by paying pensions after
retirement. If the worker is fired because of cheating, he loses his deferred
payments; see Lazear (1979, 1981) and Lazear and Moore (1984). To
reduce labour turnover the firm might pay a lower wage rate during the
training programme. To reduce adverse selection the firm may find
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screening devices or offer self-selective contracts which reveal the true
reservation wage or productivity of applicants. Finally, the firm can
provide incentives by offering long-term contracts as the internal labour
market contract proposed by Malcomson (1984).
One argument against this objection is that performance bonds or
application fees cannot be large due to capital market imperfections.
Further, the firm may be unable to shift all training costs to the worker by
lowering wages if the training period is short. Carmichael (1985) argues that
even if the worker faces constraints in the capital market, unemployment is
not involuntary because the firm can charge an entrance fee which makes
the utility of the job offer equal to the utility of the worker's reservation
rate. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985) reply that in the model proposed by
Carmichael unemployment is only 'voluntary' in a very narrow sense of the
term and that the unemployment level is still inefficient.
Another argument against this objection is that workers may be unwilling
to accept the payment of bonds or application fees. The reason is that it is
profitable to the firm to fire workers who have not cheated or to advertise
vacancies which do not exist in order to collect performance bonds or
application fees. Because of this moral hazard problem on the side of the
firm the worker may also be reluctant to accept the deferment of payments
to avoid shirking or the lowering of wages during a period of training
(especially if it is firm-specific). Note that in the turnover model the
problem of moral hazard on the side of the firm becomes less important
after the training period, because it is not in the firm's interest to fire
trained workers to collect fees which equal the training costs. Probably the
impact of the firm's reputation on future profitability can overcome the
moral hazard problem on the side of the firm; see MacLeod and Malcomson
(1991).
A second objection is that efficiency wages do not cause unemployment
if there is a competitive secondary sector. In other words, the objection is
that the wage-productivity relationship mentioned in assumption (i) does not
or not sufficiently hold, in all firms. To be more specific, assume that the
economy consists of two sectors. The primary sector pays efficiency wages,
whereas the labour market of the secondary sector is competitive. In other
words, the secondary sector consists of firms for which it is not profitable
to pay efficiency wages. All workers who are not employed in the primary
sector can obtain a job in the secondary sector.
One argument against this objection is that workers may prefer to stay
unemployed rather than accept a job in the secondary sector while searching
for a job in the primary sector, see e.g. Bulow and Summers (1986). This
may occur if employers interpret working in the secondary sector as a
signal that the worker is not very productive or if searching on the job is
less effective. As wages in the primary sector exceed wages in the
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proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970) to explain urban unemployment in
developing countries. The higher the unemployment benefits, the lower are
the costs of searching for a job in the primary sector and thus the higher is
the equilibrium unemployment rate. In my opinion this argument is not very
strong, because unemployment is a bad signal as well. Especially long-term
unemployment must be worse than acceptance of a job in the secondary
sector. Further on-the-job search may be somewhat less effective than
searching while unemployed, but the difference is probably small.
Another argument against this objection is that the assumption of a
competitive secondary sector is not realistic. Either minimum wage laws or
collective wage agreements prevent clearing of the secondary labour market;
see e.g. Van de Klundert (1988). In my opinion this argument makes more
sense. If one accepts this picture of the labour market, then unemployment
must be attributed to the combination of efficiency wage effects and
minimum wage laws or collective wage agreements. The relative importance
of efficiency wages depends on the relative size of the primary sector.
3 Union bargaining and efficiency wages
Union bargaining theory and efficiency wage theory differ in their
assumptions with respect to the discretion of union and firm. In the right-to-
manage model, a standard model in union bargaining theory (see chapter 2
for a survey), the wage rate is determined in a bargaining process between
union and firm, whereas the effort (or ability) level is assumed to be fixed
and the employment level is set by the firm. In the standard efficiency wage
models the firm sets the wage rate and the employment level, whereas the
worker determines the effort level. Combinations of these assumptions give
some interesting insights. Firstly, consider the implications of bargaining
about the wage rate, whereas the employment level and the effort level are
still set by the firm and the worker, respectively. Secondly, consider the
implications of bargaining about both the wage rate and the effort level,
whereas the employment level is still set by the firm.
The implications of bargaining about the wage rate are studied by Layard
et al. (1991, p. 540). The analysis is based on an extension of the right-to-
manage model which includes efficiency wage effects. They show that the
wage rate and the unemployment rate under bargaining and efficiency
wages are higher than under either bargaining or efficiency wages only.
They further show that under bargaining and efficiency wages the wage
elasticity of effort is below unity; in other words, the Solow condition does
not hold any more. The intuition behind these results is not difficult. The
wage rate under bargaining and efficiency wages is higher than under
efficiency wages only, because both parties gain from increasing the wage
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is the minimum rate which might result in a model with both efficiency
wages and bargaining. It results when the employer has complete market
power. Introducing efficiency wage effects in a pure bargaining model
makes it less costly for the firm to concede wage increases, because these
are partly compensated by higher effort. These arguments explain why the
wage rate under bargaining and efficiency wages is higher than under either
bargaining or efficiency wages only. The Solow condition does not hold any
more because the increase of the wage rate above the efficiency wage level
is not fully compensated by increased effort.
The implications of bargaining about the wage rate and the effort level
are considered by Rosen (1989). In an extension of the right-to-manage
model the bargaining outcome is shown to depend on whether the union
and the firm bargain explicitly over effort or not. Assume that the bargain
over wages and effort Pareto dominates the bargain over wages only. Then
the wage rate and the effort level under bargaining over wages and effort
are lower than under bargaining over wages only; employment and output
will be higher, the output price will be lower. A problem with the analysis,
which is not mentioned by Rosen, is that the firm must have perfect
information about the individual worker's effort. This assumption is
necessary to make effort negotiable. However, if the firm has perfect
information about effort (and it is verifiable by court), it is probably not
necessary to pay efficiency wages. Anyway, because the assumption of
perfect information is not conform assumption (ii), the model is not really
an efficiency wage model.
4 Insiders-outsiders and efficiency wages
The efficiency wage and the insider-outsider theories have a similar aim,
namely to explain why wages may be set above their market-clearing levels,
in other words, why involuntary unemployment may be an equilibrium
phenomenon; see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower (1987b, 1991). Despite the
similarity of their aim, the rationales which the theories offer for the non-
market clearing equilibrium wage rate are believed to be different. "In the
efficiency wage theory, it is in the firms' interest to keep wages above their
market-clearing levels. The differential between the profit-maximizing wage
and the market-clearing wage depends primarily on the responsiveness of
worker productivity to the wage (and on the imperfection of the firm's
information M.L.). In the insider-outsider theory, it is in the insiders'
interest to keep wages above their competitive levels and the insiders have
the market power to do so. Here, the differential between insider wage and
the market-clearing wage depends primarily on the insiders' bargaining
strength and the magnitude of labour turnover costs." (Lindbeck and Snower
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(1991), p. 193). The implications of the two theories for empirical firm or
industry wage equations also seem to be different. Nickell and Wadhwani
(1990, p. 497) and Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991, p. 1010) argue that
insider-outsider theory implies that the firm's product demand, the output
price and labour productivity affect the wage rate, whereas efficiency wage
theory implies that no firm-specific variable has any impact on wages.
These citations suggest that there is a clear distinction between the
efficiency wage and the insider-outsider theory.
However, is the distinction really as clear as it seems to be? At
theoretical level bargaining can be introduced in the efficiency wage theory;
see the model by Layard et al. (1991) discussed before. On the other hand,
imperfect information might play a role in the insider-outsider theory. For
example, Fehr (1990) argues that insiders can withdraw cooperation from
and engage in harassment activities to outsiders only if the firm cannot
observe this behaviour. At empirical level firm-specific variables may enter
an efficiency wage equation. As argued before, if the fair wage in the model
by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) depends on the firm's profits, then firm-
specific variables such as output price and productivity affect the wage rate.
On the other hand, aggregate variables may be relevant in an insider-
outsider wage equation. For example, the aggregate or industry
unemployment rate enters the wage equation if it affects the insiders' fall-
back utility in case the bargaining parties do not reach an agreement; see
chapter 7 for a discussion of this issue. These examples show that the
distinction between the two theories is not as clear as it seems at first sight.
The relationship between the two theories can be studied more formally
by investigating whether insider-outsider effects and efficiency wage effects
reinforce or weaken one another. In order to answer this question, Lindbeck
and Snower (1991) present a model of wage formation which combines
efficiency wage and insider-outsider effects. Their model can be interpreted
as a short-run approach, because the employment level is taken as given.
From the signs of the second-order derivatives of the wage setting function
they conclude that the efficiency wage and the insider-outsider effects do
not reinforce one another. The authors have probably made a mistake in
calculus. Anyway, their conclusion is not correct. The rest of this section
summarizes their model and shows that the effects do reinforce one another,
at least if the insider has complete market power. In some sense this result
supports the earlier argument that efficiency wage and insider-outsider
theory have a similar impact on wages.
The insider is assumed to maximize the utility surplus of reaching an
agreement. Let the utility under agreement be equal to the real wage rate
(W) and the utility under disagreement be Z, which can be interpreted as
the real reservation wage. So, the objective function of the insider (0) is
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The firm is assumed to maximize the real profit surplus of reaching an
agreement. Let the profit under agreement be AW*-W, where A denotes a
productivity index. The real output price is set equal to one. Note that the
firm's revenues depend on the wage rate, because of the incentive effect on
worker effort. The parameter P (OSpVcl) is called the productivity
responsiveness coefficient. * Let the profit under disagreement be a
function of the firing costs (F) and the hiring costs (H). Denote the profit
under disagreement by G(F,H), dG/dF<0 and 8G/dH<0. Then the objective
function of the firm (y) becomes
y(W0-/W-W-G. \|/^,=/tpw"»'-150. (6)
The inequality of y^ is explained as follows. If the first-order derivative
were positive, it would be optimal for both the firm and the insider to raise
the wage rate. So, in the range which is relevant for the bargaining process
described below the derivative must be nonpositive. Assume that the wage
rate is determined by maximizing an asymmetric Nash bargaining function
max £2=<J>''Y'-', (7)
where the insider's bargaining power is denoted by u and the firm's
bargaining power by 1-u ((Ku£l). The first-order condition can be written
as
uy+(l-u)v|yt>=0. (8)
By substituting (5) and (6) in (8) a wage setting function can be derived.
For notational convenience the substitution is postponed until the second-
order derivatives are obtained. Differentiating (8) totally to respectively P, u
and G gives
* Note that the effort function e=W* does not satisfy the restriction
e(0)<0. In fact, the firm would maximize profits by hiring an infinite
number of workers at an infinitesimally low wage rate. Lindbeck and
Snower (1991) do not encounter this problem, because the employment
level is taken as given.
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The first partial derivative implies that the higher the incentive effect, the
higher the equilibrium wage rate. The second partial derivative implies that
the higher the worker's bargaining power, the higher the equilibrium wage
rate. With respect to the third partial derivative, it should be noted that
G=G(F,H) is a decreasing function of the firing and hiring costs. So, an
increase of the firing or the hiring costs leads, via a decrease of G, to an
increase of the equilibrium wage rate. The signs of the first-order partial
derivatives are as expected.
By differentiating (9) to respectively u and G one obtains
ap ac (i3)
where X and Y are defined as
(14)
(15)
Unfortunately, the second-order derivatives appear difficult to sign.
However, it is easy to show that




In deriving these second-order derivatives, I follow Lindbeck and Snower
(1991) in setting W=A""* at u=l. '
The signs obtained for the second-order derivatives of the wage rate
differ from those obtained by Lindbeck and Snower (1991). Whereas they
find d^W/au3p<0 and d*W/dGdp=O for all values of u (0<u<l), I find that
d*W/du9p>0 and <PW/9G3p<0 if the insider has complete market power
(u=l). By interpreting the last second-order derivative, it should be noted
again that G depends negatively on the firing and the hiring costs. The
second-order derivatives imply that the sensitivity of the negotiated wage
both to insider power (u) and to firing (F) and hiring costs (H) depend
positively on the productivity responsiveness coefficient (p). In other words,
the efficiency wage and the insider-outsider effects reinforce one another if
the insider has complete market power. Whether this result holds if the
insider has less than complete market power remains to be assessed.
5 Empirical evidence on efficiency wages
The efficiency wage theory can be tested in two ways, directly and
indirectly. The direct way involves testing of the efficiency wage hypothesis
that high wages have a positive impact on worker productivity. A problem
to test the efficiency wage theory directly is that productivity of an
individual worker is costly to observe or difficult to measure. If this were
not the case, there would be no reason to pay efficiency wages at all. Some
authors have solved this problem by using aggregate data. Others have
circumvented this problem by testing the theory indirectly. The indirect way
involves testing one of the possible implications of the hypothesized
relationship, namely as the existence of wage differentials for
observationally equivalent workers. The indirect test has its own problems.
Firstly, the existence of wage differentials for observationally equivalent
workers does not verify the efficiency wage theory, because the wage
differentials may be caused by other factors as well. Secondly, the absence
of wage differentials does not falsify the efficiency wage theory, because
the hypothesized wage-productivity relationship does not necessarily cause
wage differentials. Perhaps because of these problems, the empirical
evidence on the efficiency wage theory is somewhat scarce. Unfortunately,
the empirical studies do not provide estimates of the relative importance of
efficiency wage effects in wage determination. Therefore, it is not possible
to establish empirically the impact of efficiency wages on unemployment.
' One might argue that the insider can obtain a higher wage rate by
exploiting the turnover costs.
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The rest of this section discusses, firstly, the indirect evidence and,
secondly, the direct evidence.
Some indirect evidence in favour of the efficiency wage theory is
provided by Krueger and Summers (1988). They argue that the phenomenon
of wage differences between observationally equivalent workers in different
industries which cannot be explained by neoclassical theory supports the
efficiency wage theory. The existence of inter-industry wage differences is
known from the estimation of wage or earnings functions at individual or
industry level. After controlling for human capital effects, such as education
and experience, industry specific dummies appear to be significant. The
empirical evidence surveyed by Dickens and Katz (1987) reveals that 7 to
30 per cent of all inter-personal wage variance of nonunion workers is due
to industry affiliation. Krueger and Summers (1987) show that the industry
wage structure is quite constant over long periods of time and very similar
across countries. The inter-industry wage differences can be reconciled with
neoclassical theory by arguing that they are due to either unobserved worker
heterogeneity such as differences in skill or motivation, or to differences in
job characteristics which affect worker utility or to short-run immobility of
labour. Krueger and Summers (1988) find that their empirical evidence,
based on US population survey data for 1974, 1979 and 1984, does not
support any of these explanations. Additionally, from longitudinal data
Krueger and Summers (1988) conclude that workers who switch industry
experience wage changes that closely parallel the industry wage structure
found in cross-sectional analyses. Note, however, that this result is not
undisputed. Murphy and Topel (1987) find that actual wage changes for
workers who switch industry are only weakly related to the industry wage
differences that are observed in the cross-section. They estimate that only
one-third of observed industry wage differences can be attributed to industry
effects, while two-thirds are caused by unobserved worker heterogeneity.
Anyway, after concluding that inter-industry wage differences are hard to
reconcile with standard neoclassical theory, Krueger and Summers (1988)
argue that the differences can easily be explained by efficiency wage theory.
The finding that higher wages increase tenure and reduce labour turnover
corroborates their interpretation. The presented evidence may be enough to
conclude that standard neoclassical theory is unable to explain inter-industry
wage differences. The claim that efficiency wage theory can explain the
observed wage differences needs more justification, however. For example,
one should show that the empirical evidence supports efficiency wage
hypotheses like: industries with high turnover costs or high monitoring costs
pay high wage rates.
There are some studies that shed more light on the question which
industry characteristics can explain inter-industry wage differences or, to be
more precise, which industry characteristics can explain the impact of
59C/iap/er 4
industry affiliation on individual wage rates. Dickens and Katz (1987)
conclude from their literature survey and their own analyses that average
years of education in an industry (after controlling for education at the
individual level), profits, establishment size and the capital labour ratio all
have a positive impact on the wage rate. The result on establishment size
and the capital labour ratio can be interpreted as support for the shirking
model, because monitoring is more costly in large firms and shirking more
costly if production is more capital intensive. The result on profits can be
related to the fair wage model, but can also be interpreted as evidence in
favour of insider-outsider theory. Brown and Medoff (1989) find a positive
relationship between firm size and wages as well. Teulings and Webbink
(1992) report for instance a positive impact from easiness to determine
worker effort and from external training and a negative impact from
presence of time-clocks and internal training. The positive impact from
external training and the negative impact of working time registration can
be interpreted as evidence in favour of the efficiency wage theory, the
positive impact from easiness to determine effort and the negative impact
from internal training do not support this interpretation. A theoretical
weakness of this kind of evidence is that the links between firm size and
monitoring costs and between capital intensity and shirking costs etc. are
hardly elaborated. An empirical weakness is that no attempt is made to
discriminate between alternative explanations, such as offered by the
efficiency wage theory and the insider-outsider theory. At this stage the
evidence is too weak to conclude that the inter-industry wage differences
provide evidence in favour of the efficiency wage theory.
Further indirect evidence on the hypothesized wage-productivity
relationship is provided by Lazear and Moore (1984). They argue that the
observed positive relationship between age and earnings of wage and salary
workers are due to human capital accumulation and incentive effects,
whereas the positive relationship between age and earnings for self-
employed has to do with human capital effects only. By comparing the
steepness of age-earnings profiles of wage and salary workers with those of
self-employed, they conclude that most of the slope can be attributed to
incentive effects. It should be emphasized that the evidence implies only
that incentive effects are relevant; it does not imply that efficiency wages
are paid.
Direct evidence on the efficiency wage theory is obtained by
investigating the impact of wages on shirking, turnover and output. A study
by Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) provides some evidence on the impact of
wages on shirking. They study the frequency of disciplinary lay-offs in the
plants of a large US automobile company in 1982. The company pays the
same wage to identical workers irrespective of the alternative industry wage
in the plant's region. The authors find that in plants where the firm's wage
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problems is low. A high unemployment rate also leads to a low frequency
of disciplinary lay-offs, but this effect is not significant. Their results can be
interpreted as partial evidence in favour of the shirking model. On the one
hand I agree with the authors that the equality of wages at all plants
strengthens the evidence, because it does not give rise to simultaneity
problems of wages and lay offs at plant level. On the other hand I would
say that it weakens the evidence, because full application of efficiency wage
considerations would lead to different wage rates per plant, depending on
the alternative wage in the same region and industry.
Some evidence supporting the shirking model is given by Dickens et al.
(1989). They argue that the simplest economic theories of crime predict that
profit-maximizing firms should combine low expenses on monitoring with
large penalties for employee crime. In fact, firms' outlays on monitoring of
employees are considerable. Probably, large penalties are ruled out by legal
restrictions or would have an adverse impact on worker morale. Besides
spending on monitoring, the firm might pay high wages to reduce employee
crime. So, the explanations which are offered for large outlays on
monitoring are also consistent with the payment of premium wages.
Unfortunately, the authors do not provide any formal test of the
hypothesized relationship between wages, monitoring costs and employee
crime.
An interesting case to study the relationship between wages and output is
the increase of wages from 2.34 to at least 5 dollars per day in 1914 by
Henry Ford. The motivation behind the measure is somewhat unclear.
Whereas Raff (1988) concludes that Ford was 'driven by the threat of
collective action' (p. 387), Bulow and Summers (1986) cite that 'the theory
(that management was trying to avert the threat of unionization M.L.) is not
supported by real evidence' (p. 379). Anyway, Raff and Summers (1987)
conclude that the wage increase has reduced labour turnover and has
increased labour productivity. As training costs to perform the relative
simple tasks were probably low, the increase of labour productivity is best
explained by the improvement of worker morale. The authors conclude that
the wage increase by Ford provides some evidence in favour of the gift
exchange model.
Direct evidence on the impact of wages on output is provided by
Wadhwani and Wall (1988). The evidence is obtained by the estimation of a
production function on panel data from 211 manufacturing companies in the
UK over the period 1972-1982. To avoid simultaneity bias because of the
endogeneity of the wage rate, the parameters are estimated by instrumental
variables. The results show that the relative wage rate and the
unemployment level have a positive impact on firm-level output. There is
also some evidence that the relative wage change has a positive impact on
61productivity. The authors interpret this result as evidence in favour of a gift
exchange model in which workers adapt their wage norms to past
achievements.
The results summarized above suggest that the empirical evidence
supports the efficiency wage theory. However, the question arises whether
the beneficial effects of a high wage policy on shirking, turnover and output
are strong enough to compensate its costs. Cappelli and Chauvin (1991)
estimate that the wage costs to reduce the number of disciplinary problems
by one are 121,000 dollars. A company representative suggested them that
the administrative costs associated with a dismissal can run as high as
75,000 dollars. They further argue that due to imperfect monitoring the real
reduction in shirking exceeds the observed reduction. So, the benefits of
reduced shirking may outweigh the increase of labour costs. Bulow and
Summers (1986) cite evidence that at Ford productivity increased by 51 per
cent following the introduction of the high wage policy. Raff and Summers
(1987) estimate that 6 to 19 per cent of the increase of wage costs was
offset by reduced turnover. They do not provide an estimate of the impact
of the high wage policy on productivity via improved morale. Probably the
increase of wages by Henry Ford was not totally offset by the increase of
productivity. Wadhwani and Wall (1988) estimate that the elasticity of the
wage rate with respect to output is between 0.35 and unity; the elasticity of
unemployment with respect to effort, which is measured by labour
productivity, is about 0.15. If the wage elasticity is below unity, the higher
productivity does not fully compensate the higher wage costs. Overall, high
wage rates seem to reduce shirking and turnover and to boost output, but
the effect may be too weak to make the high wage rate profitable. Note that
neither the finding that the benefits of high wages do not fully compensate
wage costs nor the finding of a wage elasticity of effort below unity
necessarily provide evidence against the efficiency wage theory. As argued
in section 3, an extension of the standard efficiency wage model leads to an
elasticity below unity; see also Akerlof and Yellen (1986, pp. 14-16).
6 Concluding remarks
The efficiency wage theory argues that it may be profitable to the firm to
pay more than the market-clearing wage in order to prevent workers from
shirking, to reduce labour turnover, to improve worker morale or to attract
applicants with high ability. The standard models provide an explanation of
natural or structural unemployment. The theory can explain the cyclical
variability of unemployment if one additionally assumes that changing
wages and/or prices is costly. The theory can explain the persistence of
unemployment if one assumes that wage norms adapt slowly.
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There are two objections to conclude that efficiency wages explain
unemployment. One objection is that more complex contracts can be
devised which provide incentive effects without causing unemployment.
Another objection is that efficiency wages do not cause unemployment if
there is a secondary sector with firms for which it is not profitable to pay
more than the market-clearing rate.
The efficiency wage theory can be tested directly via the hypothesized
wage-productivity relationship or indirectly via wage differentials for
observationally equivalent workers. A weakness of the indirect empirical
evidence is that other theories can explain wage differentials as well. The
direct evidence, although scarce, provides some support for the hypothesis
that high wages improve productivity. The empirical evidence does not
establish whether efficiency wages cause unemployment.
The interaction between efficiency wage and insider-outsider effects are
studied by Lindbeck and Snower (1991). Unlike their conclusion, these
effects are shown to reinforce one another, at least if the insider has
complete market power.
There are several routes for further research on efficiency wages. Firstly,
the theory should make clear under what conditions more complex contracts
are feasible and under what conditions efficiency wages must be paid.
Preferably, this should be done in a dynamic general equilibrium context;
see Hoon and Phelps (1992). Secondly, further empirical research should
shed more light on the relative importance of efficiency wage considerations
in wage determination and unemployment. Thirdly, although the relevance
of the efficiency wage theory in explaining wage determination and
unemployment in Western Europe is limited because of the dominance of
trade unions, the theory may be helpful in explaining wage drift; see chapter
5.
635 An efficiency wage model of wage drift:
evidence from the Netherlands (1972-1983)
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an explanation for wage
drift, which is the phenomenon that wages change faster (some-
times slower) than contract wages. The hypothesis put forward is
that the firm's rationale for paying more than obliged stems from
efficiency wage considerations. Empirical results for the private
sector in the Netherlands (1972-1983) suggest that this explana-
tion makes sense. The estimates also reveal that lower contract
wage changes are partially compensated by higher wage drift and
vice versa. This suggests that wage drift weakens the impact of
wage moderation by trade unions.
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1 Introduction
A comparison between actual wage rates and contract wage rates on unionized
labour markets reveals that actual wage rates rise mostly somewhat faster than
contract wage rates. The difference between the relative change in the actual
wage rate and the relative change in the contract wage rate is called wage drift.
According to Phelps Brown (1962), 'wage drift has been conspicuous in the
democracies with predominantly industry-wide settlements - in Scandinavia,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Australia' (p. 339). Calmfors and
Forslund (1989) state that in the last decade wage drift has contributed to
about 65 and 40 per cent of total wage increases in the manufacturing sector
in Norway and Sweden, respectively. Between 1972 and 1983 the average
weekly wage rate in the Dutch private (manufacturing and service) sector
increased 7.5 per cent, the average contract wage rate increased 7.4 per cent,
the average wage drift being 0.1 per cent. Although the mean was relatively
small, the variance in wage drift was pretty large. It varied from -1.6 per cent
in 1981 to 1.2 per cent in 1976 (CBS (1984)). The data, which exclude
overtime and which are corrected for structural changes in the labour force, are
illustrated in figure 1.
Earlier authors, such as Hansen and Rehn (1956), Marquand (1960), Phelps
Brown (1962), Isaac (1965), Gould (1967), Gillion (1968), Gerfin (1969),
Jacobsson and Lindbeck (1969, 1971), Isachsen (1977), Schager (1981),
Söderström and Uddén-Jondal (1982), Gahlen and Ramser (1986) and
Holmlund (1986), have attributed wage drift to excess demand for labour,
productivity increases of piece workers, price increases, excess profits, distorti-
ons of the relative wage structure, and tax changes. As can be seen from table
O contract wage change + wage drift
Figure 1 Contract wage change and wage drift
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671, the empirical results support the Phillips-curve relationship between wage
drift and excess demand for labour. The effect of other variables is less clear.
A deficiency of the earlier literature is that often no sound choice-theoretical
foundation for the hypothesized relationship is provided. An exception is a
more recent paper by Holden (1989). He argues that wage drift is negatively
related to inventories, because large inventories reduce the firm's costs of a
strike. Holden 's explanation is based on the assumption that workers bargain
collectively at the firm level after the wage negotiations at industry level.
Unlike Scandinavian practice, wage drift in the Netherlands arises mainly
through interaction between the employer and the individual employee.
Whereas strikes are a common threat in collective bargaining, the individual
worker is more likely to quit, to shirk or simply to become less productive if
(»)he considers the wage rate to be too low. Therefore, wage drift in countries
like the Netherlands requires a different explanation.
Another problem with the earlier literature is that little attention has been
paid to the relationship between wage drift and contract wage formation.
Phelps Brown (1962) already observed that there is some disagreement about
the impact of contract wage changes on wage drift. One position is that wage
drift is an independent additive to contract wage changes. In this case one can
say, the lower the contract wage change, the lower the total sum of wage
changes. The other position is that contract wage changes and wage drift are
just alternative ways of arriving at the same rate of change, which is e.g.
determined by demand and supply. Now the total sum of wage change is
independent of the contract wage change. In other words, the lower the
contract wage change, the higher the wage drift. The opposite relationship, the
impact of wage drift on contract wage changes, has hardly been touched at all,
whereas most authors analyzing wage drift take contract wages as given.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to provide an explanation for
wage drift which is settled between the employer and the individual employee.
Secondly, to investigate the relationship between contract wage changes and
wage drift. The proposed explanation for wage drift is based on the efficiency
wage hypothesis, which can be summarized as: the higher the wage rate, the
higher the individual worker's effort. The analysis results in a model which
explains simultaneously contract wage changes and wage drift. The analysis
differs from earlier work in two aspects. Firstly, in the present study contract
wages and wage drift are explained simultaneously, whereas in earlier wage
drift studies contract wages are taken as given. If the presented model is
correct, the negative impact of wage drift on contract wages reveals that the
latter cannot be assumed to be exogenous. Secondly, the earlier explanations
of wage drift fit in the tradition of Phillips (1958), relating the change in the
wage rate to the unemployment rate (or level). The presented model joins more
recent practice of relating the wage level to the unemployment rate or,
equivalently, of relating the wage change to the change in the unemployment
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rate. This relationship, which is sometimes called the wage curve, is found in
e.g. Sargan (1964), Layard and Nickell (1986), Blanchflower and Oswald
(1990), and Graafland (1991).
A limitation of the model is that the efficiency wage interpretation of wage
drift cannot be tested formally. Under the alternative hypothesis that the
individual worker's effort does not depend on the wage rate, there is no reason
for the employer to pay more than the contract wage rate. The presented model
collapses to the standard monopoly union model. Merely the existence of wage
drift falsifies the alternative hypothesis. However, the efficiency wage hypothe-
sis can be tested informally by checking both the descriptive (or predictive)
power of the model and the validity of the restrictions derived from theory.
The efficiency wage hypothesis is tested in this limited sense on data from the
private sector in the Netherlands (1972-1983). The empirical analysis should
also provide some insight into the relationship between contract wage changes
and wage drift.
The set up of this chapter is as follows. A specification of the individual
worker's effort is offered in section 2. Section 3 presents the efficiency wage
model of wage drift. A contract wage equation is derived in section 4. Section
S presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
2 The individual worker's effort
The efficiency wage theory, which is surveyed in chapter 4, argues that there
is a positive relationship between the wage paid by the firm and the worker's
productivity. The model presented below employs an extended version of the
effort function proposed by Akerlof (1982). The effort function is based on the
assumption that for psychological reasons a worker is more productive if (s)he
is offered a higher wage rate. This does not exclude other interpretations of a
positive relationship between the wage rate and the worker's effort, however.
Relatively little empirical specifications of the effort function are found in
the efficiency wage literature. Akerlof (1982; p. 561) proposes the following
specification
e=-Y„+Y,0W/s Y„,Y,>0, 0cy,<l, 0)
where e denotes effort, W the nominal wage rate and W, the reference wage
rate. Akerlof argues that the restriction 0<Y2<l is necessary to insure that the
wage elasticity of effort is decreasing in W, which is necessary for a
maximum. The negative intercept is required to prevent the firm from setting
the wage rate equal to zero, giving infinite effort per dollar. The reference
wage rate specified by Akerlof is based on the assumption that the typical
worker has a chance of being unemployed (u) receiving the unemployment
benefit B and a chance of finding another job (1-u) receiving the wage rate
69paid by other firms (WJ. In empirical work the reference wage rate cannot
simply be computed as a weighted arithmetic mean of the available indices for
the alternative wage and unemployment benefit, because the index numbers do
not reflect any difference in absolute magnitude between the two variables.
The problem of scaling is reduced to a missing multiplicative constant, which
is irrelevant after taking relative differences, by computing the reference wage
rate as a weighted geometric mean of the alternative wage and the unemploy-
ment benefit
W^Wj-fl". (2)
In order to translate Akerlof s effort function to our context the following
definition is introduced
W=(l+w,)lV, (3)
where W, and w, denote the contract wage rate and the relative wage gap,
respectively. The wage gap is related to wage drift (w^) via
w,-Aln(l+H-p=AlnW-AlnW,, (4)
where A denotes the first-difference operator. In words, (4) says that wage drift
is defined as the relative change in the actual wage rate minus the relative
change in the contract wage rate. The reference wage rate, defined in (2), is
based on the assumption that the individual worker's chance to get another job
is (1-u). Search theory suggests that this assumption is somewhat too simple.
Therefore, it is relaxed by supposing that due to some matching technology the
chance to get a job (1-q) is a function of the unemployment rate and the
vacancy rate
<7=<7(w,v), <7,>0, <7j<0, (5)
where u and v denote the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate, respective-
ly. Further, B can be replaced by defining
6=fi/W_, 0<6<l, (6)
where b is the replacement ratio. Using (5) and (6), the reference wage rate is
defined as
ÏV,=VV 6«"-">. (7)
The choice of the alternative wage rate W. will depend on the context. At
sectoral level it can be set equal to the aggregate wage rate or the manufactur-
ing wage rate. Assuming that workers aim at a certain share in value added
(the 'fair' share, see McDonald and Solow (1981)), value added per worker
seems a good alternative at aggregate level. Finally, I allow for the possibility
that the individual worker compares either his gross wage rate (YJ=O) or his net
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wage rate (73=1) to the reference wage rate. Denoting the employees' tax rate
by Sj, the effort function can be defined as
(8)
It is easy to see that the effort function has the appropriate sigmoid shape in
the relative wage gap (w^). Further, the effort becomes constant (namely e=l)
if both y<) and Y2 approach zero and Yi approaches one. '
3 Efficiency wage model of wage drift
Let the representative firm maximize its short-run profit function (Fl) by
choosing the relative wage gap (w,) and the employment level (N); the capital
stock (K) is assumed to be predetermined. Assuming that the firm is small, the
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate may be taken as given. The contract
wage rate, the alternative wage rate, the tax rate, and the replacement ratio are
supposed to be exogenous for the firm as well. Let the firm's production
technology be described by the production function f(K,eN), which is
increasing and concave in K and eN, constant returns to scale, twice
continuously differentiable, and which satisfies the Inada conditions. Then the
firm's optimization problem may be written as
max
S.t. 1




The Solow (1979) equation becomes
' The model may be generalized by making the value of Yj (j=0.1.2) dependent
on the individual i. This may also provide a rationale for the institutional setting
in which the union sets the contract wage and the firm the wage drift: if there
is heterogeneity of labour, it may be optimal for the firm to pay only some
workers more than the contract wage.
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(12)
The Solow equation can be used to derive an empirical wage drift equation.
Taking natural logarithms and first differences, one obtains
Aln(l+wp=Alne-Aln<?,. (13)
Letting the subscript -1 denote the value one period lagged, this can be
approximated by
!üi_«^l- !_._fu Ij—L. (14)
Taking a first-order Taylor series approximation of e respectively e, around e.,
respectively (e,)., gives
A(1+H-)+— ÜAW
(I**-.) w, ' ee, ' • ' (15)
ee,
Note that the subscripts -1 have been dropped to simplify notation. Combining








Recall that the subscripts -1 of the level variables have been dropped. Let w,.
and w, denote lnW,. and lnW,, respectively. Equation (17) can be (log)linear-
ized by taking a first-order Taylor series expansion around the steady state
(Au=Av=Alnb=O). It is easy to see that the resulting wage drift equation
contains no level variables but only variables in first differences:
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Note that the parameter Yi6 >s of the order of magnitude of q(.). which is the
probability to remain unemployed. In other words, according to the presented
model the effect of changes of the replacement ratio on wage drift is small.
Note further that the parameters of the wage drift equation (18) are not related
to the parameters Yo. Yi and Yz- Although these parameters determine the
magnitude of the relative wage gap (see equation (11)), they do not determine
the change of it. Evidence in favour of the efficiency wage model cannot be
obtained by testing directly the theoretical restrictions on the parameters of the
effort function. Only indirect evidence is obtained via the estimates of the
determinants of effort on wage drift. Note further that wage drift is indepen-
dent of the capital stock. If the initial capital stock is multiplied by a factor X,
the optimal employment level becomes X times as large as well, leaving effort
and wage drift unaffected.
4 Union wage setting
Assume that the contract wage rate is set unilaterally by a monopoly union.
Less restrictive would be the assumption that union and firm bargain about the
wage rate, as in the right-to-manage model. This model has not been chosen
because it is difficult to make the theoretical concept bargaining power
operational. Fortunately, there appears to be little difference between the wage
equations derived from the monopoly model and from the right-to-manage
model; see Hoel and Nymoen (1988). A third possibility is to assume that the
bargaining outcome is on the contract curve, as in the efficient bargain model.
This assumption does not seem realistic, because bargaining about employment
is rare in the Netherlands.
Let union preferences with respect to the contract wage rate and the
employment level be represented by the quasi-concave utility function G.
Assume that the union maximizes its utility function taking the workers' effort
level and the firm's wage gap as given. As the bargaining outcome of the
monopoly model is on the labour demand curve, the union chooses the contract




From the first-order conditions follows that the optimal contract wage rate
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satisfies
Assume that the production function is of Cobb-Douglas form, with the capital
stock being fixed in the short run
y-/(/r,WV)-Atf"(«?Ny"". O«x<l, (21)
where Y denotes the output level. The parameter A captures technical progress,
which is assumed to be exogenous. An advantage of using a Cobb-Douglas
specification, instead of e.g. a CES specification, is that the unobserved effort
level can be eliminated from the contract wage equation. Assume further that
the union's preferences can be described by the utility function proposed in
chapter 3 (omitting insider-outsider effects)
G(W,,A0-l*7V<i-~, CJl.esO. (22)
The intuition behind this utility function is that the higher the unemployment
rate and/or the lower the replacement ratio, the higher the weight the union
attaches to employment. Under these specifications of the production
technology and the union's preferences the contract wage equation becomes
W =a( 1 -a) ^ !__. (23)
(l*w,)NC+TlM-e6
Taking logs and first differences, and linearizing by taking a first-order Taylor
series expansion around the steady state (Au=Ab=O) gives
A
(24)
where p, y and n denote lnP, lnY and lnN, respectively. Note that the contract
wage equation, as the wage drift equation, contains only explanatory variables
which are in first differences. At the outset it is unclear whether the union is
primarily interested in the gross or the net wage rate. The relationship between
the gross wage rate (W.) and the net wage rate (W„) is given by W,(1-S2)=W..
Taking logs and first differences, and rearranging terms gives Aw,=Aw„-Aln(l-
Sj). Therefore, the contract wage equation is modified by including the
employees' tax term -
^)
(25)
If the tax rate coefficient is equal to zero the union does not shift taxes to the
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employer, if the coefficient is equal to one, taxes are fully shifted.
The Nash equilibrium is found by combining the reaction functions (18) and
(25). The equilibrium can be illustrated graphically as the point of intersection
of the reaction curves in the (w,,,Aw,.) space. If the two reaction curves have
different slopes, i.e. if Yn^'Afti' then there exists an equilibrium and it is
unique. If the two curves have the same slope, there is a multitude of equilibria
or there is no equilibrium at all. As a matter of fact, the theoretical model
suggests that the two curves are identically sloped (y,,=l/yj,=l). This problem
can be solved by relaxing the assumption that the incentive effect of contract
wage changes and wage drift is the same. If, for example, under sectoral
contract wage determination a higher contract wage increases the reference
wage as well, the incentive effect of wage drift may exceed the incentive effect
of a similar contract wage change (Yu<l)- The equilibrium is stable if the
union's reaction curve (25) is steeper than the firm's reaction curve (18), i.e.
if Yu<l/Yif As the estimates satisfy this restriction, the equilibrium is stable
and unique. '
5 Data and empirical results
Usually, wage drift is calculated as the difference between the relative increase
in average hourly earnings (including overtime) and the relative increase of
contract wage rates. The change in earnings is measured on the basis of the
changing actual composition of the employees, whereas the change in the
contractual wage rate is based on some constant group of workers. Apart from
the effects of changes in overtime and in shiftwork, the wage drift figures are
biased by structural changes in the composition of employment, such as
changes between low-paid and high-paid jobs, between younger and older
workers or between male and female workers. Further, wage drift figures
include changes in the remuneration system (e.g. from piece rates to time
rates). The uncorrected figures are called gross wage drift and the corrected
figures net wage drift; cf. Isaac (1965) and Gerfin (1969).
Gross wage drift data are easy to obtain. As the correction for structural
changes requires detailed information about the composition of the group of
employees, there are only small sets of net wage drift data available. The result
is that the researcher can choose either a large set of poor quality data or a
small set of high quality data. Some authors, such as Gerfin (1969) for West-
Germany and Holden (1989) for Norway, argue that the biases in the gross
* Different slopes of the contract wage curve (25) and the wage drift curve (18)
may also be defended by introducing heterogeneity of labour. See footnote 1.
Whereas a change in the contract wage affects all workers, a change in the wage
gap only some of them.
75wage drift data are relatively small. According to CBS (1984), the average
wage drift in the private sector in the Netherlands between 1972 and 1983 is
about 0.1 per cent, whereas the average wage increase due to structural
changes is about 0.8 per cent. These figures clearly show that for the
Netherlands the biases are in proportion far too large to be neglected in
empirical work. Therefore, the empirical results are based on a small set of
weekly earnings (excluding overtime) in the private sector in the Netherlands
(1972-1983) which are corrected for structural changes; see CBS (1984).
Consumer price indices, and unemployment and vacancy rates are obtained
from the same source. Tax rates, replacement ratios and labour productivity
data are from CPB. Changes in the unemployment rate and in the vacancy rate
are illustrated in figure 2.
In the empirical work the reference wage rate is approximated by the
consumer price index, labour productivity and a trend; after taking first
differences the trend becomes a constant. A priori, it is not clear whether wage
drift results from current or past labour market characteristics. For this reason
weighted averages of current and lagged differenced unemployment and
vacancy rates are incorporated. The weights of the current unemployment rate
and those of the current vacancy rate (both in first differences) are restricted
to be the same. In symbols, the expression y^Au+y^Av is replaced by
Y,4(uAu.,+(l-u)Au)+ Yi5(nAv.,+(l-u)Av), 0£u£l. As contract wages for, say,
1973 are determined before the 1973 unemployment rate is available, the
unemployment rate of 1972 seems more relevant. Therefore, the unemployment
rate appears with a lag of one year in the contract wage equation. In 1976,
1980 and 1981 the government introduced wage control measures which
reduced price compensation in the contract wage rates. The compensations
• change of unemployment rale + change of vacancy rale
Figure 2 Change of unemployment and vacancy rate
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were cut with 3.7, 2.5 and 2.0 per cent, respectively. It seems reasonable to
assume that the union seeks to catch up in the years after the wage controls.
Therefore, a wage control dummy (wcdum) is included which has the value
-0.037, -0.025 and -0.02 for 1976, 1980 and 1981, respectively, and the value
0.037, 0.025 and 0.02 for 1977, 1982 and 1983, respectively. For other years
the dummy has the value zero. If the estimated wage control parameter has the
value one, the wage control measures were fully effective; if it is zero, the
measures were ineffective.
Before turning to the estimation results, let me briefly comment on the
identification of the wage drift and the contract wage equation. Approximating
the reference wage rate by consumer prices, labour productivity and a trend
leaves little difference between the determinants of contract wages and those
of wage drift. This might give rise to identification problems. Fortunately,
current unemployment and current and lagged vacancy rates are probably
significant determinants of wage drift, but not of contract wages. On the other
hand, wage control measures are more likely to affect contract wages than
wage drift. Assuming that these variables are significant, there is no identifica-
tion problem. It should be noted that most of the previous authors estimate a
wage drift equation only, which might give rise to identification and
simultaneity problems.
Unfortunately, the number of observations is too small to estimate with
instrumental variables. Therefore, the wage drift equation (18) and the contract
wage equation (25) are estimated by three-stage least squares. The consump-
tion price parameter in the contract wage equation is set equal to one to reflect
wage indexation clauses. These were generally adopted in union wage
contracts during the estimation period. The other parameters are freely
estimated. As can be seen from table 2, the reported estimates have the correct
signs and are mostly significant. Note, however, that the results should be
interpreted cautiously, because the data set is rather small.
In the wage drift equation the estimated coefficient on the contract wage
change is (absolutely) significantly smaller than one. The estimate implies that
every 1 per cent decrease of the contract wage rate increases wage drift by 0.7
per cent. Possibly the reason that the coefficient is below one is that the
reference wage rate changes with the contract wage rate. If this is the case, an
increase of the contract wage rate has less impact on effort than an increase
of the wage gap. The coefficient on consumer price inflation does not
significantly differ from unity. The estimate of the unemployment rate is
absolutely smaller and that of the vacancy rate greater than one. Note that the
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate enter with a lag of 0.65 year. The
labour productivity term enters with a coefficient considerably below one.
Apparently, the reference wage rate is a function of both a trend of 0.4 per
cent and of labour productivity growth. The tax rate and the replacement ratio
appeared insignificant and are omitted. The insignificance of the tax rate
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w, - 0.0037 - 0.72Aw, + 1.03Ap, + 0.063A(y-n)
(0.0010) (0.04) (0.06) (0.017)
- 0.72 (0.65AM., +O.35Au) + 1.31 (0.65 A v_,+0.35 A v)
(0.04X0.04) (0.12)
R-squared: 0.99, DW: 2.07.
Aw, - 0.019 - 0.97*, + lAp, + 0.31A(y-n)-1.47A«_, + 0.50AZ»
(0.002) (0.17) (-) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
• 0.30Hrd«/n.
(0.05)
R-squared: 0.99, DW: 2.29
notes
a Data pertain to the private sector in the Netherlands (1972-1983).
b Estimation is carried out by the 3SLS routine of TSP 4.1.
c Standard errors are given in parentheses.
suggests that the worker compares his gross wage rate to the reference wage
rate. Obviously, the worker recognizes that if he earned the reference wage rate
he should pay taxes as well.
The wage drift coefficient in the contract wage equation is (absolutely)
insignificantly different from unity. This suggests that trade unions correctly
anticipate on wage drift in setting contract wages. Contract wages increase
with a trend of nearly 2 per cent and with one third of labour productivity
growth. The effect of an increase of the unemployment rate on contract wage
changes is about twice as large as the one on wage drift. Unlike the result for
the wage drift equation, the replacement ratio is a significant determinant of
contract wage changes. The wage control measures do not appear to be very
effective. If the government reduces price compensation with 1 per cent,
contract wage increases are reduced by only 0.3 per cent. In the year after the
wage control measure the forgone wage increase is caught up. An attempt to
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include the weighted dummy without the catch-up effect was less successful.
As in the wage drift equation the employees' tax rate did not play a role and
is omitted. One might wonder why the employers' tax rate is not incorporated
in this study, despite its significance in the wage equation reported in chapter
3. The reason is that the wage rate data used in chapter 3, which were obtained
from CPB, include employers' taxes, whereas the wage rate data used in this
study, which are from CBS, do not.
As set out in the introduction the presented model does not allow formal
testing of the efficiency wage hypothesis. Nevertheless, the results can be
interpreted as weak evidence in favour of the hypothesized relationship. The
fit of the model is reasonably good. The estimates are of the correct sign and
magnitude, and mainly significant. The only unexpected result is that the
replacement ratio appeared to be insignificant in explaining wage drift.
Although other explanations are possible, I am inclined to interpret the results
as weak evidence in favour of the efficiency wage hypothesis.
6 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents a model of contract wage rates, which are determined by
a monopoly trade union, and of wage drift, which is set by a representative
employer. The explanation offered for the employer's behaviour of paying
more than obliged is based on the efficiency wage hypothesis: the employees
are assumed to be more productive if the wage rate is increased. The resulting
wage drift equation is not of the Phillips-curve type, whereas the change (not
the level) of the unemployment rate enters as explanatory variable. The
empirical estimates, which are obtained from aggregate data of the Dutch
private sector (1972-1983), support the proposed explanation. With respect to
the relationship between contract wage changes and wage drift, the estimates
suggest the following. One per cent more wage drift implies one per cent less
contract wage change, whereas one per cent more contract wage change results
in only 0.7 per cent less wage drift. Apparently, the impact of wage modera-
tion by trade unions is weakened by wage drift. Government intervention by
wage control measures does not appear to have much effect on contract wage
changes.
Theoretically, the model can be improved by studying the impact of the
capital stock on wage determination. Empirically, the study can be improved
by using a larger data set, or by using panel data on industry wages.
79Insider-outsider vs. human capital effects in
union wage formation
Abstract
This chapter proposes an alternative approach to introduce
heterogeneity of labour in standard models of union wage
formation. In the well-known insider-outsider approach the
union makes a distinction between members and nonmembers
or between employed and unemployed workers. In the human
capital approach, which is proposed in this chapter, the firm
makes a distinction between trained and untrained workers. The
two approaches appear to have quite different implications with
respect to employment of unprivileged workers (outsiders
respectively untrained workers) under monopoly unionism and




A standard assumption in union wage bargaining theory (see Oswald (1985)
or chapter 2 for a survey) is that labour is homogeneous. That the union
does not differentiate between workers can be seen from the standard union
utility functions, such as the expected utility function and the utilitarian
utility function. These functions reflect the assumptions that all workers are
union members and that the union attaches equal weight to all members.
That the firm does not differentiate between workers can be seen either
from the production or revenue function. The function reflects the
assumption that all workers have equal skills and ability and are equally
productive. Because of the homogeneity assumption the firm (or the union)
can assign jobs and lay-offs by random draw. The homogeneity assumption,
which is rather unrealistic, can be relaxed.
One approach to introduce heterogeneity of labour is to distinguish
between insiders and outsiders. The distinction between insiders and
outsiders can be made in various ways. In Carruth and Oswald (1987) and
in Jones and McKenna (1989) the insiders are union members, the outsiders
are nonmembers. According to e.g. Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987),
Gottfries and Horn (1987) and Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992) the group
of insiders is equivalent to the incumbent workforce, whereas the outsiders
are the unemployed. In Graafland (1992) and in chapter 3 the insiders are
the employed and short-term unemployed, the outsiders are the long-term
unemployed.
Unfortunately, it remains unclear why the adopted distinctions between
insiders and outsiders in union preferences are relevant to explain wage
formation and employment. The distinction between members and
nonmembers only makes sense if members are privileged in the distribution
of jobs. Generally, the union is mainly involved in wage determination and
not in the selection process of new workers. This suggests that the
distinction between members and nonmembers is only meaningful in so-
called 'closed shops'. The other distinctions, between employed and
unemployed workers and between employed and short-term unemployed
workers and long-term unemployed workers, are surely relevant, but it
remains unclear why the union should make them. It makes sense to
introduce one of these distinctions in union preferences if there is a strong
relationship between membership and employment status. This might be the
case if bargaining is at firm level. Under sectoral or national bargaining the
relationship between membership and employment status is probably loose.
In the Netherlands, where 80 per cent of the employees is covered by a
collective wage agreement while less than 30 per cent is union member,
there is no tight relationship between membership and employment status.
82In this context it remains unclear why the union should favour the interests
of the employed only.
The purpose of this chapter is to present another approach to introduce
heterogeneity of labour in models of union wage formation. It may be
called the human capital or duration approach. The difference between the
insider-outsider approach and the human capital or duration approach may
be characterized as follows. In the insider-outsider approach the union
differentiates between workers, whereas the firm does not. ' In the human
capital approach the firm makes a distinction between 'trained' and
'untrained' workers, whereas the union does not. The rationale for the firm
to make a distinction between trained and untrained workers is a difference
in costs. The human capital approach is inspired by the work by Lindbeck
and Snower (1986), who state that it is costly to exchange a finn's current,
full-fledged employees (the trained workers) for unemployed workers (the
untrained workers). * A similar approach has been proposed independently
in an empirical study by Graafland (1990). ' The human capital models of
union wage formation, which are presented in this chapter, are static and do
not include uncertainty in labour demand. Actually, the models can be
considered as the human capital version of the insider-outsider models
proposed by Carruth and Oswald (1987). The simple structure of the models
facilitates comparing the implications of the two approaches. It appears that
the implications are quite different. Firstly, in the insider-outsider approach
(with no uncertainty in labour demand) a monopoly union will never set the
wage rate such that outsiders are hired, whereas in the human capital
approach it can be fully rational for a monopoly union to let in outsiders.
Secondly, in the insider-outsider approach the contract curve in the efficient
bargain model coincides with the downward-sloping labour demand curve
for employment levels beyond the number of insiders, whereas in the
human capital approach it is found to be upward sloping. An innovative
' This does not hold for Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 1987a, 1988). In
these papers the productivity difference between insiders and outsiders is the
cause of the insiders' bargaining power.
* As the proposed human capital approach is inspired by the work by
Lindbeck and Snower, it may be called an insider-outsider approach as well.
To emphasize the difference with so-called insider-outsider models in which
the distinction between workers is based on union preferences, this term is
not adopted.
' Whereas Graafland (1990) presents a human capital version of the
monopoly union model only, this chapter considers both the monopoly model
and the efficient bargain model.
83aspect of this chapter, besides the introduction of human capital effects in
wage bargaining models, is a correction of the picture of the contract curve
in Carruth and Oswald (1987).
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. The insider-outsider
approach to introduce heterogeneity of labour in union wage determination
models as proposed by Carruth and Oswald and by Jones and McKenna is
summarized in section 2. Some additional derivations, which are necessary
to draw correctly the contract curve of the model by Carruth and Oswald,
are relegated to an appendix. Section 3 presents the human capital approach.
The concluding remarks are to be found in section 4.
2 The insider-outsider approach
2.1 Union's and firm's preferences
In the insider-outsider approach the distinction between workers is based on
union preferences. The insiders are the members of the union, the outsiders
are the nonmembers. The distinction between these two groups is relevant if
the union pays more attention to the utility of its members than of
nonmembers. The strongest assumption in this respect, which is adopted by
Black and Bulkley (1984) and by Carruth and Oswald (1987), is that the
union is totally indifferent to employment of nonmembers. Assuming the
union has utilitarian preferences, the utility function G becomes
g'(.)X). $"(.)£0, 8^-1 for AteW, 8^-0 for A/>Af,
where W is the wage rate, B is the alternative wage or unemployment
benefit, N is employment, M is union membership and g(.) is the individual
worker's utility function. The alternative wage or unemployment benefit and
union membership are assumed to be exogenous. Nickell and Andrews
(1983) and Jones and McKenna (1989) assume that the union attaches a
value to employment of nonmembers which is positive but less than the
value of employment of members. Jones and McKenna motivate this
assumption by arguing that the union values a large membership and that
some of the employed outsiders might enter the union. The utilitarian utility
function proposed by these authors can be written as
(2)
, g^O, «"50, 8^-1 for NSW, 8„„=0 for
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Note that this is a generalization of the utilitarian utility function proposed
by Carnith and Oswald. By setting q=0, (2) reduces to (1).
The fiim is assumed to maximize short-run profits. The short-run profit
function can be written as
rX»7V)=/?(A0-MV. *'()>0, /?"(.)<0, (3)
where R(N) is a strictly concave revenue function. Throughout this chapter
wages, benefits, revenues and profits are assumed to be deflated by a
general price index, in other words they are defined in real terms.
The preferences of union and firm play a central role in the insider-
outsider version of the monopoly union model and the efficient bargain
model, as presented by Camith and Oswald (1987) and Jones and McKenna
(1989). These models are considered in 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
2.2 Monopoly union model
In the monopoly union model the employment level is set by the firm such
that profits are maximized. If the firm takes the wage rate as given, the
profit-maximizing employment level is given implicitly by
Equation (4) can be inverted to give the conventional downward-sloping
labour demand curve.
The wage rate is set by the monopoly union such that its utility is
maximized. The union is constrained by the firm's labour demand function.




In Carruth and Oswald (1987) the union does not care at all about
employment of nonmembers (q=0). Under this assumption employment
levels beyond union membership are not feasible. There is no point of
tangency between the downward-sloping labour demand curve and the
horizontal part of the union indifference curves. The maximum employment
level which is feasible is that all members are employed (N=M). As can be
seen from figure 1, this result obtains if the labour demand curve is flatter
than the union indifference curve for N<M. Jones and McKenna (1989)
criticize the result that nonmembers are never employed. They show that if
the union does care about nonmembers (0<q51), the equilibrium




Figure 1 Monopoly model with
strong insider-outsider preferences
Figure 2 Monopoly model with
weak insider-outsider preferences
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Whether the union cares about nonmembers has profound implications for
wages and employment over the business cycle. Consider the impact of
arise of the marginal revenues which is caused by either a rise of the
relative output price or by a productivity shock. If wages and employment
of union members are normal goods, both will rise. The increase of
employment will continue until all members are employed. If the union
does not care about nonmembers a further rise of the marginal revenues will
increase the wage rate, but leave employment unaffected. If the union
attaches a lower weight to nonmembers than to members, employment will
remain sticky during a period of rising output price or productivity, while
the wage rate will increase. The output price or productivity has to become
very high, before employment will exceed union membership.
23 Efficient bargain model
In the efficient bargain model the union and the firm are assumed to
negotiate about both wages and employment. Assuming that the union has
utilitarian preferences as specified in (1) and does not value the employment




where Flo is some minimum profit level. Initially, assume that in the
optimum N*M. From the necessary conditions for a maximum of this
Kuhn-Tucker problem follows the contract curve equation
Consider the case N<M. By setting 5NM=1 in (7), one obtains
^AQ_^. (8)
The slope of the contract curve for N<M is found by differentiating (8) to
N:
** *W0*> ) ^ ^.xo. (9)
In words, (9) says that, if the individual worker is risk averse, the contract
curve is upward-sloping for employment levels below union membership.
For N>M, the contract curve is found by setting 6"NM=0 in (7). This results
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In other words, the contract curve coincides with the downward-sloping
labour demand curve for employment levels beyond union membership.
Finally, assume N=M in the optimum. Then the contract curve becomes
vertical. According to Carruth and Oswald, the contract curve is upward-
sloping, vertical and downward-sloping for, respectively, employment levels
below, equal to and above union membership; see figure 3. Their depiction
of the contract curve is criticized in the appendix. The point is that it is
misleading to draw the upward-sloping and downward-sloping parts of the
contract curve in the same picture, because they actually pertain to different
values of the exogenous parameters. It is shown that the contract curve can
have three different shapes, depending on the profit-maximizing
employment level evaluated at the alternative wage rate and on union
membership; see figures 4-6. It is difficult to say which of the three
situations is empirically most relevant. What is clear, however, is that under
powerful unionism nonmembers will not be employed. This suggests that
not only in the monopoly model, but also in the efficient bargain model,
nonmembers' chances are bad if union preferences are as suggested by
Carruth and Oswald.
It is easy to show that if union preferences are as supposed by Jones and
McKenna, the contract curve beyond union membership can be either
upward-sloping or downward-sloping, depending on the weight the union




From the necessary conditions for a maximum of the Kuhn-Tucker problem
follows the contract curve equation
Consider the case N<M. Setting 6^M=1 in (12) yields (8). This result is not
surprising because the union utility function for N<M is the same as before.
The slope of the contract curve is given by (9), which implies that for N<M
the contract curve is upward-sloping. For N>M, the contract curve is found





Figure 3 Contract curve
according to Carruth and Oswald
Figure 4 Contract curve for high
benefits (B>W„, N„<M)
IK
Figure 5 Contract curve for
moderate benefits (B=W„, Ng=M)
Figure 6 Contract curve for low
benefits (B<WM, NB>M)
89The slope of the contract curve is found by invoking the implicit function
theorem and by differentiating to N:
This expression is difficult to sign generally. In the limiting cases the sign
is easily obtained. Consider the case q=0. Then (13) reduces to
and (14) becomes
^ (16)
As in the model proposed by Carruth and Oswald, the contract curve
coincides with the downward-sloping labour demand curve. Alternatively,





which is equivalent to (9). In other words, if q=l the slope of the contract
curve is the same for N<M and N>M. Of course, one should check which
of the assumptions N<M and N>M actually applies. These examples show
that whether the contract curve is upward-sloping or downward-sloping
beyond union membership depends among other things on the value the
union attaches to nonmembers.
Again consider the impact of the business cycle on wage rate and
employment. Simulations by Carruth and Oswald show that a rise of the
relative output price or productivity firstly increases only the employment
level until it equals union membership. A further rise of the output price or
productivity leads to an increase of the wage rate, leaving employment
unaffected. Finally, the rise of the output price or productivity will increase
employment beyond union membership, while the wage rate remains
constant. Note that these results are obtained under the assumption that the
union does not care about nonmembers.
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3 The human capital approach
3.1 Firm's and union's preferences
Alternatively, let the distinction between workers be based on differences in
human capital. Assume that the workers can be divided in two groups. One
group consists of workers with a large stock of human capital, the other
group of workers with a small stock of human capital. Call them 'trained
workers' and 'untrained workers', respectively. The untrained workers are
assumed to be more costly to the firm than the trained workers, because of
training costs. Assume that the total number of trained and untrained
workers willing to work in the representative firm equals L. The number L,
which can be interpreted as union membership or firm-specific labour
supply, is assumed to be fixed. Let the number of trained workers, which
can be employed at costs W, be M (M<L). Then the number of untrained
workers equals L-M. They can only be employed at costs W+C, where C>0
denotes training costs (in real terms). It is easy to see that it is profitable for
the firm to hire trained workers sooner than untrained workers. The firm is
assumed to maximize short-run profits. Ignoring the comer solutions N=0
and N=L, the firm's optimization problem can be written as
max (,O(0w,(), , ,
* (19)
with 8^=0 for /V<Af, 8^=1 for W>Af.
A problem in solving the optimization problem is that the profit function
cannot be differentiated at N=M. The isoprofit curves are kinked at this
point; cf. figure 7. Assuming an interior solution (0<N<M or M<N<L), one
obtains as first-order condition
/?'(AO-W-8„„C=0, for CkAkA* and Af</V<Z- (20)
Further, it is easy to see that
N=Af for W such that /?'(A/)-C<W</?'(A/). @1)
So, the firm's labour demand curve is defined implicitly by (20) and (21).
The union is assumed to have utilitarian preferences which can be
specified as
*'(.)>0. *"(.)<0. (22)
The assumption of utilitarian preferences is not essential. It is made to
facilitate the interpretation of some results and to enable comparison with
the results of section 2.
91Figure 7 Kinked isoprofit curve
and labour demand curve
G-G»
Figure 8 Corner solution in
monopoly union model
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The monopoly model and the efficient bargain model which include a
distinction between trained and untrained workers are presented in 3.2 and
3.3.
3.2 Monopoly union model
In the monopoly model the union maximizes a utility function subject to the
firm's labour demand curve. If the union's preferences are of the utilitarian




Assuming an interior solution (N*M), the first-order condition for a
maximum can be written as
*Ï2^2>-M?"(/V), (24)
«'(HO
which is also found in e.g. McDonald and Solow (1981). Together with the
labour demand function (20) one has two equations in two unknowns. The
second-order condition for a maximum is
2# '(WO/? "(A0 +Afc »(K0[rt "W +Afc '(HOW"<0, (25)
which is evaluated in the optimum. The first two terms are negative and
nonpositive, respectively, by assumption. The sign of the last term is
unknown. In the rest of this chapter the revenue function and the utility
function are assumed to be such that the second-order condition is satisfied.
The comer solution is
W=/?'(M), W=Af. (26)
The solution of this problem, which is illustrated in figure 8, may lie on the
upper part of the labour demand curve, on the lower part or at the comer
N=M. From (24) and (26) follows that there is a range of wage rates which
cannot be optimal. As can be seen from figure 8, the downward sloping
union indifference curve cannot be tangent to the vertical part of the labour
demand curve, except at the comer. This property of the human capital
version of the monopoly model is stated more formally in proposition 1.
Note that the proposition holds for all utility functions which are increasing
and quasi-concave in W and N.Proposition 1
A monopoly union maximizing an increasing and quasi-concave utility
function subject to a trained-untrained labour demand curve of a profit-
maximizing firm will not choose a wage rate W such that W„-C<W<WM,
where W„ is the wage rate which equals the marginal revenue after hiring
the last trained worker (W„=R'(M)). In the monopoly model W„ is equal to
the corner solution. C is the untrained worker's additional training costs.
Proof
From (21) it is clear that for WM-C5W<W„, the firm's labour demand is
given by N=M. The union utility function is increasing in the wage rate.
Therefore, G[W„,M]>G(W,M) with WM-C<W<WM- [W„,M| is feasible,
because it is on the labour demand curve. So, a wage rate W such that W„-
M cannot be optimal.
When will the union choose a wage rate such that untrained workers will
be hired? Assuming the second-order condition is satisfied, the conditions
under which employment is below or above the number of trained workers
are as follows. The optimal employment level is below the number of
trained workers if





hold, where (W*,N*) denotes the optimal pair of wage rate and employment
under the restriction N>M. Equation (28) is a feasibility condition which
ensures that the assumption N*>M is correct. Equation (29) is an optimality
condition which guarantees that the union's utility in (W*,N*) exceeds the
corner solution utility. In other words, it guarantees that the local optimum
is also the global optimum. The comer solution applies if (27) and either
(28) or (29) do not hold.
Intuitively, it is clear that training costs might hinder or reduce the
employment of untrained workers. It is easy to show that a subsidy of
training costs increases the probability that untrained workers are hired or
increases the number of employed untrained workers if some of them are
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hired already. To show this note that a subsidy S (0<SSC) is analytically
equivalent to a reduction of training costs.
Proposition 2
Let the union's preferences be of the utilitarian type. Assume further that
the firm's revenue function is concave and that the individual worker is risk
averse. Assume, finally, that the second-order condition (25) holds. Then a
subsidy of training costs in the insider-outsider version of the monopoly
model (19) increases the probability that untrained workers are hired and
enhances employment if some untrained workers are hired already.
Proof
To show that a subsidy of training costs increases the probability that
untrained workers are hired, note that the left-hand side of the feasibility
condition (28) is decreasing in C. So, the lower C, the more likely that the
feasibility condition is satisfied and that untrained workers are hired. To
show that employment of untrained workers is increased by a subsidy of
training costs if some untrained workers are hired already, use the labour
demand equation (20) to substitute for W in (24). By invoking the implicit
function theorem, it can be shown that
D. (30)
The negative sign of the derivative implies that a subsidy of training costs
has a positive impact on employment if some untrained workers are hired.
Finally, consider the development of wage rate and employment during
the business cycle. If the union has utilitarian preferences it is easy to show
that an increase of the relative output price or a productivity shock has a
positive impact on employment. Only if employment equals the number of
trained workers, a rise of the output price or of productivity leaves
employment unaffected. If employment is below the number of trained
workers, a price increase or productivity shock has no effect on employment
in both models. If employment equals the number of trained workers, the
output price or productivity and the wage rate are positively correlated. If
employment exceeds the number of trained workers, a higher output price
or a productivity shock does not alter the wage rate.
3.3 Efficient bargain model
The efficient bargain model requires that the union and the firm bargain
about both the wage rate and the employment level. The outcome is on a
contract curve which, generally speaking, does not coincide with the labour
demand curve. The bargaining outcome is found by solving
95(31)
where Go and n„ are the fall-back levels of the union and the firm,
respectively. * For simplicity, the fall-back levels are assumed to be zero. *
By eliminating X from the two first-order conditions, one obtains an
equation for the contract curve
^**\ or /V>JW. (32)
Because the right-hand side is negative, (32) implies that in the efficient
bargain model marginal revenue falls short of marginal cost. The slope of
the contract curve is considered in proposition 3.
Proposition 3
Let the union's preferences be represented by a utilitarian utility function.
Let the worker be risk averse and the firm's revenue function be concave.
Then the contract curve (32) is upward sloping for N<M and N>M.
Proof
The slope of the contract curve is found by differentiating (32) to N
(33)
Due to the concavity of the revenue function (R"<0), the risk aversion of
the individual worker (g"<0) and the inequality implied by (32) (R'(N)-W-
), the contract curve is upward sloping.
As is well-known, the contract curve is vertical if the worker is risk neutral.
So far the results hardly differ from those of the standard efficient
bargain model as reported by McDonald and Solow (1981). The interesting
* The efficient bargain model of the insider-outsider approach is written
as a constrained maximization problem, whereas the efficient bargain model
of the human capital approach is written as a generalized Nash bargaining
function. It is easy to show that the two formulations are equivalent.
* The assumption that the fall-back levels are zero does not play a role
in the derivation of the contract curve, but it affects the end points. If the
fall-back levels are positive, the set of feasible solutions is reduced. For
example, if Go>O, the contract curve does not start at W=B.
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question is what happens if the employment level equals the number of
trained workers. This is the subject of the following proposition.
Proposition 4
Let the union's preferences be represented by a utilitarian utility function
and let the firm's revenue function be concave. Then the contract curve is
vertical at N=M. If the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied,
the wage rate is an increasing function of the union's bargaining power.
Proof
Differentiating the Nash bargaining function (31) to W, and evaluating the
first-order condition at N=M gives
•0. (34)
The second-order condition for a maximum, which is assumed to be
satisfied, can be written as
tW<*V (35)
The relationship between the wage rate and the union's bargaining power
becomes clear by differentiating the first-order condition (34) to A.. Invoking
the implicit function theorem, one obtains
«'<*"> X). (36)
Equation (36) implies that the wage rate is an increasing function of the
union's bargaining power at N=M.
In the derivations above it is simply assumed that the contract curve
exists for both N<M, N=M and N>M. This is not necessarily true, however.
Consider the case that the union's bargaining power is zero. This case is of
special interest, because this is the lowest point of the contract curve. If
X^O, the union is forced to accept a wage rate equal to the alternative wage.
Substituting W=B in the contract curve equation (32) gives
*'(rV)-0-8«aC«O. (37)
For employment levels below the number of trained workers,
Because of the concavity of the revenue function, a necessary and sufficient
condition for N<M to hold, is that
97(38)
For employment levels above the number of trained workers, 5NM=1.
Because of the concavity of the revenue function, a necessary and sufficient
condition for N>M to hold, is that
H^«/?W)>fl+C. (39)
If neither (38), nor (39) holds, the optimal employment level (for X=0) must
equal the number of trained workers. Graphically, if (38) holds, the contract
curve starts at N<M. If (38) holds, the contract curve consists of only one
part in the region N>M. If neither (38), nor (39) holds, the contract curve
starts with a vertical part at N=M. Figures 9-10 illustrate the contract curve
under the assumption of risk aversion.
Again, consider the question whether a subsidy of training costs increases
the probability that untrained workers are hired or whether it enhances
employment of untrained workers if some of them are hired already. For the
efficient bargain model it is possible to derive a quite general result.
Proposition 5
Let the individual worker be risk averse or risk neutral and let the union
have utilitarian preferences. Let the firm's revenue function be concave. Let
the wage rate and the employment level be determined according to the
efficient bargain model (31), and let the fall-back levels be zero. Then a
subsidy of training costs increases the probability that untrained workers are
hired and it enhances employment if some untrained workers are hired
already.
Proof
To show that a subsidy of training costs increases the probability that
untrained workers are hired, it is sufficient to note that the lower C, the
higher the probability that the feasibility condition (39) is satisfied. To show
that a subsidy of training costs enhances employment if some untrained
workers are hired already, combine the two first-order conditions for a
maximum of (31) to eliminate W. By invoking the implicit function
theorem it can be shown that
8C D
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By assumption, employment exceeds the number of trained workers (N>M)
and the individual worker is risk averse or risk neutral, so the nominator is
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Figure 9 Contract curve for high
benefits (B>W„, N„<M)
Figure 10 Contract curve for
low benefits (B<WM-C,
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positive. The firm's revenue function is concave, which implies that the
denominator is negative. Therefore, 3N/9C is negative.
The development of wage rate and employment level during the business
cycle in the efficient bargain model is qualitatively nearly the same as in
the monopoly model. The only difference is that if employment exceeds the
number of trained workers, a higher output price or productivity does not
alter the wage rate in the monopoly model, but reduces the wage rate in the
efficient bargain model. The comparative statics imply that the spill-over
effects from the product market to the labour market are not unanimous.
4 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents an alternative approach to introduce heterogeneity of
labour in standard models of union wage formation. In the well-known
insider-outsider approach the union makes a distinction between members
and nonmcmbers. In the human capital approach, which is proposed in this
chapter, the firm makes a distinction between trained and untrained workers.
The two approaches appear to have quite different implications with respect
to the employment possibilities of unprivileged workers under monopoly
unionism and the slope of the contract curve under efficient bargaining
between union and firm. In the insider-outsider approach a monopoly union
will never be willing to let in outsiders. In the human capital approach it
can be fully rational for a monopoly union to choose a wage rate such that
untrained workers will be hired. In the insider-outsider approach the
contract curve coincides with the downward-sloping labour demand curve
for employment levels above union membership if union and firm bargain
efficiently. In the human capital approach the contract curve is found to be
upward sloping for employment levels beyond the number of trained
workers if the individual worker is risk averse.
The two approaches to introduce heterogeneity of labour have quite
different policy implications as well. In the insider-outsider approach the
employment level depends on the membership rules. The government might
enhance employment by forbidding discrimination against nonmembers or
by forbidding closed shops. In the human capital approach a subsidy of
training costs might reduce the range of 'employment stickiness', by
reducing the vertical part in the labour demand curve or in the contract
curve, if all trained workers are hired; it has a positive impact on
employment if some untrained workers are already hired.
An important drawback of the models presented in this chapter is that
they are static and incomplete, because the number of untrained workers is
assumed to be predetermined. The number of trained workers may be made
endogenous by relating it to the number of previously employed workers.
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The resulting models may be useful to explain unemployment persistence.
This dynamic human capital approach is somewhat similar to the insider-
outsider approach proposed by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987) and
Gottfries and Horn (1987). An important difference is that in the human
capital approach it is the firm that cares about the employment status of
workers, whereas in the insider-outsider approach it is the union. Dynamic
insider-outsider models with uncertainty and their implications for
unemployment persistence are surveyed in chapter 7. The dynamic
implications of human capital on union wage formation have to be
elaborated in future research.
Appendix Derivation of the contract curve
The derivation of the contract curve by Camith and Oswald, which results
in figure 3, is incomplete. There are two questions which deserve further
consideration before a figure is drawn. Firstly, when are the assumptions
N<M and N>M, respectively, correct? Secondly, what happens at N»M?
Answering the first question seems difficult, because an explicit solution for
N cannot be obtained without specifying a utility function and a revenue
function. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that the assumptions apply for
different values of the exogenous parameters.
Introduce the following notation. Consider for a moment the case of a
profit-maximizing firm which is free to choose the employment level
according to the labour demand curve. Let W„ denote the wage rate at
which the profit-maximizing firm will hire exactly all union members, i.e.
WM=R'(M). Further, let Ng denote the number of workers the profit-
maximizing firm will hire if the wage rate equals the alternative wage, i.e.
N„ is defined implicitly by R'(NB)=B. Due to the monotony of R'(.), Ng is
uniquely defined. Now, consider again the situation that the union and the
firm bargain about both wage rate and employment. Assume that the wage
rate equals the alternative wage. Substituting W=B in the contract curve
equation (8) gives
From (A.I) it is easily seen that at B the contract curve coincides with the
labour demand curve. Because of the concavity of the revenue function R, a




Substituting W=B in the contract curve equation (10) also results in (A.I).
101Again the contract curve coincides with the labour demand curve at W=B.





If WM=B, neither N<M, nor N>M can hold, so N=M must be true.
Summarizing, if the wage rate equals the alternative wage, the bargaining
outcome is on the labour demand curve. Whether the employment level is
below, equal to or above union membership depends on the profit-
maximizing employment level at the alternative wage and on union
membership.
The case considered above is a limiting case, for B is the lowest value of
W for which the contract curve is well-defined. Now, consider what
happens if the union's bargaining power increases, such that the union is
able to reach a higher isoprofit curve. Initially, assume Ng<M. Due to the
continuity of the optimization problem, the optimal wage rate and
employment level are found by moving along the upward-sloping contract
curve. In other words, if the union's power increases, both the wage rate
and the employment level increase. Alternatively, assume Ng>M. The wage
rate and the employment level follow the downward-sloping contract curve
in northwestern direction. So the wage rate increases while the firm is
allowed to reduce the employment level according to the labour demand
curve. Irrespective of its initial level, employment approaches membership
if union bargaining power increases.
This brings us to the second question, what happens if employment
equals union membership? Firstly, it will be argued that an increase in
union bargaining power (a lower value of n„) does not affect the employ-
ment level if it equals union membership. Both a movement in southwestern
direction along the upward-sloping contract curve and a movement in
southeastern direction along the downward-sloping contract curve imply a
reduction of union utility. As a larger choice set cannot lead to a lower
union utility level, the conclusion is that if employment equals union
membership, an increase in the union's bargaining power does not affect
employment. Secondly, it is shown that an increase in the union's
bargaining power has a positive impact on the wage rate. Because






Not surprisingly, in the optimum the constraint holds as an equality. In
other words, the optimal wage rate is
^. (A.7)
Differentiating (A.7) to IT,, gives
:0. (A.8)
Therefore, if the union is able to force the firm to accept a lower profit
level, the optimal wage rate increases at N=M.
The upshot of this discussion is that the contract curve can have three
different shapes. Firstly, if Ng<M (WM<B), the contract curve is upward-
sloping for N<M and vertical at N=M. Irrespective of the union's
bargaining power, no outsiders will be employed. Secondly, if Ng=M
(WM=B), the contract curve is vertical at N=M. Irrespective of the union's
bargaining power, employment equals union membership. Thirdly, if NB>M
(WM>B), the contract curve is vertical at N=M and downward-sloping at
N>M. Nonmembers are employed if the union's bargaining power is low.
The result is depicted in figures 4-6. Note that the figures are drawn for
different values of the alternative wage or unemployment benefit (B),
keeping union membership (M) constant. Alternatively, one might draw the
figures for different values of M, keeping B constant. This completes the
derivation of the contract curve.
1037 Insider-outsider effects and the persistence
of unemployment
Abstract
This chapter provides a review of theoretical and empirical work
on insider-outsider and duration effects in union wage formation.
The innovative aspect of the chapter is that the different
theoretical models are classified according to the hypothesized
impact of previous employment, unemployment and long-term
unemployment on the wage rate. The survey of empirical results
shows that the effect of previous employment on the wage rate
is generally insignificant. Unemployment and long-term unem-
ployment (besides short-term unemployment) appear to have a
significant negative impact. Micro-studies reveal that both firm-
specific and aggregate variables play a role in wage determina-
tion. The insider-outsider and the duration effects are too weak
to cause full hysteresis.
1051 Introduction
Unemployment appears to be persistently high in Western Europe. In the
Netherlands, for example, unemployment fluctuated around two per cent in the
sixties, increased to around six per cent in the late seventies and increased
further to fifteen per cent in the early eighties. In the late eighties and early
nineties the unemployment rate started to diminish to some seven per cent
now. The increase of unemployment in the late seventies and early eighties
may be attributed to higher oil prices (see Bruno and Sachs (1985)) and to real
wage increases in response to increases of taxes and benefits and a widening
gap between consumer prices and producer prices (see Layard and Nickell
(1985. 1986, 1987), Bean et al. (1986) and chapter 3). In the late eighties oil
prices fell and taxes and benefits were reduced, at least in the Netherlands, but
unemployment does not decrease as fast as predicted by the models. In other
words, the models mentioned before are unable to explain the persistence of
unemployment. There are at least three theories which deal with this problem.
Firstly, capital shortage theory states that after a recession the capital stock is
too small to employ the whole labour force. This explanation, which is
discussed by Bean (1989), is further neglected. Secondly, insider-outsider
theory argues that after a recession wages are increased before unemployment
is reduced because wage determination is dominated by employed 'insiders',
who do not take into account the interests of unemployed 'outsiders'. Thirdly,
duration theory suggests that long-term unemployed have little influence on
wage determination because they reduce search effort or firms do not want to
hire them. This may be due either to the loss of human capital during long
spells of unemployment or to discrimination ('stigmatization') by employers.
The distinction between insider-outsider theory and duration theory is not
as clear as it might seem at first sight. Actually, it depends on the definition
of insiders and outsiders; the alternative definitions are discussed in chapter 3.
Especially if the insiders are the employed or short-term unemployed and the
outsiders are the long-term unemployed the implications for wage determina-
tion in insider-outsider theory are close to that of duration theory.
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to evaluate whether insider-outsider
and/or duration effects in wage formation are able to explain unemployment
persistence and, secondly, to evaluate the empirical evidence.' The innovative
aspect of the chapter is that the theoretical models are classified according to
' This chapter does not consider the question why unemployed workers do
not underbid union wages. This question, which is considered at length by
Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 1987a, 1988), is considered of minor importance
because of legal restrictions in many countries.
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the hypothesized impact of previous employment, unemployment and long-
term unemployment on the wage rate. The paper closest to this is Blanchard
(1991). This review provides a more formal presentation of the theoretical
models and pays more attention to the empirical results. The survey about
unemployment by Nickell (1990) has a much wider scope than this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 2 considers the role of
previous employment in union wage formation and unemployment persistence.
The role of unemployment and of long-term unemployment are considered in
section 3 and 4 respectively. Whereas sections 2 and 3 concentrate on insider-
outsider theory, section 4 refers to duration theory as well. Section S explains
the link between the theoretical and the empirical work. The empirical results
on insider-outsider and duration effects in wage determination are surveyed in
section 6. The conclusions and the suggestions for further research are given
in section 7.
2 Previous employment and wage determination
Persistence of unemployment may be caused by insiders setting wages in their
own interest. This results in either a negative relationship between the current
wage rate and previous employment (Gottfries and Horn (1987)) or in a
positive relationship between the wage change and the lagged employment
change (Blanchard and Summers (1986)). Firstly, these papers are reviewed
separately. At the end of the section the relationship between the models is
discussed. Although this section is based largely on the papers mentioned,
similar models are presented by Solow (1985) and Sampson (1988).
Gottfries and Horn (1987) assume that union membership consists of all
previously employed workers. The firm's labour demand is subject to
exogenous demand shocks. The monopoly union is assumed to set the real
wage rate, before knowing the realization of this shock. After its realization the
firm is supposed to set the employment level according to the labour demand
curve. If the shock turns out to be favourable, some outsiders will be hired as
well. In Gottfries and Horn (1987) the union's preferences are represented by
an expected utility function. For mathematical convenience a simpler utility
function, adopted from Blanchard and Summers (1986), is utilized in the
present chapter. For the same reason labour demand is not represented by a
general functional form and a multiplicative shock as in Gottfries and Horn,
but by a loglinear function with an additive shock. The simplified model
suffices to derive their main results.
Let the firm's labour demand be represented by
«=a-pw^+e, (1)
where n and w, denote labour demand and the real wage rate, respectively (all
variables are in logs). The demand shock e is assumed to have zero mean. Of
107course, the demand shock should be restricted in order to prevent labour
demand becoming less than zero. The union is assumed to set the real wage
rate such that the expected employment level equals union membership (m)
r-*». (2)
where the asterisk indicates optimality. By taking expectations of (1),
substituting (2) and by replacing membership m by previous employment n
one obtains
w>^.-^L. (3)
Differentiating to the lagged employment level gives
Replacing union membership by lagged employment in (2) and by differen-
tiating to it, leads to
Equations (4) and (5) confirm the result by Gottfries and Horn (1987) that 'the
smaller the number of workers employed in the previous period, the higher the
optimal wage, and hence the lower the expected employment level in the
current period' (p. 881). By integrating the wage setting equation in a simple
macro-economic model, the authors show that 'a monetary shock has a
persistent effect on employment' (p. 883).
In Blanchard and Summers (1986) the trade union sets the nominal wage
rate (in logs: w); the firm determines the price level (p) and the employment
level. Labour demand, which is assumed to be dynamic, is specified as:
(6)
Note that for notational convenience the constant term is omitted. Unlike
Gottfries and Hom (1987), Blanchard and Summers interpret the term e not as
a demand shock but as a productivity shock. They assume that e follows a
random walk. The monopoly union is supposed to set the wage rate such that
expected labour demand equals a weighted average of union membership and
lagged employment:
, (7)
If 7*=l, the previous employment level determines the wage rate. There results
hysteresis. If y=0, the target employment level is independent of history. In





Equation (8) shows there is a negative relationship between the wage rate and
the desired employment level, as in Gottfries and Horn (1987). Equation (9)
shows that if the union cares about previously employed only (y=l), the
employment level follows a random walk. In this case there results full
hysteresis. If the union cares about all workers (0<Y£1, m=Is with Is denoting
the log of the labour force), employment follows a first-order process around
the level of the labour force. In general, the higher the weight from outsiders
in union preferences, the lower the persistence of employment. The relationship
between union preferences and (unemployment persistence is further
elaborated in Blanchard and Summers (1987).
Equation (8) plays an important role in empirically testing insider-outsider
theory. This equation cannot be estimated directly, because Blanchard and
Summers assume expected productivity to be correlated with past productivity
and thus with past employment. Lagging (6) and substituting in (8) yields:
(10)
where A is the first-difference operator and k=-[l/p(l-s)](l-y)m. For reasons
not made clear Blanchard and Summers (1986) neglect the term k in their
empirical work. Their testing procedure concentrates on the coefficients of
employment lagged once and twice. If there is full hysteresis (y=l), real wage
growth depends positively on the change of the employment level. If there is
no hysteresis at all (y=0), the ratio of the coefficient of employment lagged
twice to the coefficient of employment lagged once cannot exceed 1/2 (in
absolute value).
The model derived above can be made more in line with standard wage
equations by assuming that the labour force is constant (a heroic assumption).
Using the approximation
where u denotes the unemployment rate, this results in
Aw-*'+(Ep-p_,)+_J_[jAi«_, +(1 -Y)M.,], (12)
(1(1-j)
where k'=[(l-y)/p(l-s)](ls.,-m). Note that the constant term drops if m=ls.,. The
resulting wage equation is very close to a standard Phillips curve which allows
109for a rate of change effect è la Lipsey. Under full hysteresis the real wage
growth depends negatively on the change (rather than the level) of unemploy-
ment. However, this result can also be interpreted as evidence in favour of the
wage curve approach. This is easily seen by taking first differences of the
wage curve equation. Whereas there is evidence that the wage curve approach
is more able to explain wages than the Phillips curve approach (see
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990)), this procedure is likely to confirm the
hypothesis of hysteresis, even if it is wrong.
Comparison of the testing procedures proposed by Gottfries and Horn (1987)
and Blanchard and Summers (1986) reveals another serious problem, namely
their sensitivity to the underlying assumptions. By taking first differences, the
model by Gottfries and Hom (1987) implies a negative relationship between
the wage change and the lagged employment change under hysteresis.
Blanchard and Summers (1986) argue there is a positive relationship between
the wage change and the lagged employment change. At first sight its seems
strange that testing the same hypothesis can lead to different expected signs.
The discrepancy is due to two differences in the assumptions. Firstly, Gottfries
and Hom assume that the shocks are uncorrelated, whereas Blanchard and
Summers assume that they follow a random walk. Secondly, in Gottfries and
Horn employment adjusts instantaneously, whereas in Blanchard and Summers
employment adjusts gradually. Finally, the testing procedure by Blanchard and
Summers has the problem that under full hysteresis the parameter of the lagged
employment change cannot be estimated, because the variable itself will be
zero (apart from an irrelevant error term). Because of these problems,
empirical studies using one of these testing procedures must be interpreted
with care.
3 Unemployment and wage determination
Alternatively, unemployment persistence may be caused by the absence of a
negative impact of unemployment on the wage rate. If the union feels
responsible for both employed and unemployed workers, union membership
may be set equal to the labour force. Replacing union membership by the
labour force in equation (7) shows that the union either sets wages in the
interest of all previously employed (7*1), or sets wages such that there results
full employment (Y=0), or somewhere in between. Whereas the current
magnitude of the labour force is probably unknown at the time of wage
determination, let us use the lagged value. Union membership may then be
approximated by
m=/$_,a/i.,+«.,. (13)
Substituting (13) in (8) yields
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Note that the lagged employment level will have a negative impact on the
wage rate, irrespective of whether there is hysteresis or not. If the expected
value of the shock is zero, this equation can easily be estimated. If the (lagged)
unemployment rate appears to have a significant impact on the wage rate this
provides evidence against full hysteresis. Nickell and Wadhwani (1988)
interpret the significance of aggregate unemployment in a firm-level wage
equation in this way.
A problem with this testing procedure is that the significance of the
unemployment rate does not necessarily imply that the union cares about
unemployed. This is easily shown by dropping the assumption that wages are
determined by a monopoly union. Assume, alternatively, that wages are
determined in a bargaining process between union and firm and that the
employment level is set unilaterally by the firm. These assumptions are well-
known from the right-to-manage model; see Nickell (1982) and Nickell and
Andrews (1983). Let the bargaining process be described by an asymmetric
Nash bargaining model. The outcome depends on the alternative options
available to union and firm during the bargaining process and on the parties'
relative bargaining power. It is quite likely that the aggregate unemployment
rate affects these alternative options and/or the relative bargaining power. So
an alternative interpretation of a significant unemployment effect in wage
determination is that it weakens the union's power to realize the insiders'
purposes; see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower (1987a).
4 Long-term unemployment and wage determination
Finally, unemployment persistence may be caused by the ineffectiveness of
long-term unemployment to depress wages. Both insider-outsider and duration
theory suggest that long-term unemployed may have a different impact on
wages than short-term unemployed. Firstly, long-term unemployed may resign
from the union. For this reason the union may give a lower weight to the
preferences of long-term unemployed. This hypothesis is found in Graafland
(1992) and in chapter 3. Secondly, long-term unemployment may cause
deterioration of skills. In order to save training costs, employers might prefer
to hire short-term unemployed. Thirdly, employers may interpret long-term
unemployment as a signal that the worker is not as good as others, otherwise
he/she would have been hired before. This might be called the stigma effect.
Fourthly, long-term unemployed may reduce search intensity. Whereas the first
is an insider-outsider effect, the last three are duration effects.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discriminate between insider-outsider and
duration effects. Both result in a wage equation in which the wage rate
111depends negatively on the unemployment rate and positively on the long-term
unemployment rate (or negatively on the long-term unemployment rate and
more negatively on the short-term unemployment rate). If the empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis, further research is necessary to find out
which of the reasons mentioned above causes this effect. It should be noted
that most authors who investigate the impact of long-term unemployment on
the wage rate do not provide an explanation for long-term unemployment
itself. For this reason the models are incomplete.
5 Transition to empirical work
The various contributions on insider-outsider theory and duration theory
reviewed in the previous sections provide several testable hypotheses. Firstly,
Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Gottfries and Horn (1987) suggest that the
wage rate depends on the number of previously employed. Blanchard and
Summers (1986) assume that the union sets the wage rate such that the
expected employment level equals a weighted average of past employment and
union membership. This results in a Phillips curve wage equation in which the
expected real wage growth depends positively on the change (rather than the
level) of employment. Gottfries and Horn (1987) derive another testing
framework by incorporating the membership effect. By assuming that union
membership consists of all previously employed workers they argue that the
wage level depends negatively on the lagged employment level.
Secondly, as noted by Nickell and Wadhwani (1988), the model by
Blanchard and Summers (1986) implies that after allowing for the impact of
previous employment on wage determination aggregate unemployment should
be insignificant. Although the insignificance of unemployment provides
evidence in favour of insider-outsider theory, the significance of unemployment
does not falsify the theory. It is quite likely that unemployment enters an
insider-outsider wage equation, because unemployment affects the bargaining
power of the insiders.
Thirdly, a limited effect of long-term unemployment on wage determination
provides evidence in favour of insider-outsider theory or duration theory. It is
an insider-outsider effect if the union cares more about employed and short-
term unemployed than about long-term unemployed; see Graafland (1992) and
chapter 3. It is a duration effect if it results from a reduction of search
intensity by long-term unemployed workers or from an increase of training
costs during long-term unemployment.
Before turning to the empirical results, consider the level of aggregation.
Generally, the theoretical models can be estimated and tested at both micro and
aggregate level. The choice of the aggregation level depends on the centraliza-
tion of wage determination. Furthermore, the availability of data plays a role.
An advantage of firm or industry data (besides not requiring unrealistic
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assumptions which allow aggregation) is that these allow the assessment of the
relative impact of internal (firm-specific) variables like output price, labour
productivity or profit per worker and of external (aggregate) variables like the
aggregate wage rate and the unemployment rate. The hypothesis that internal
or firm-specific variables are important in wage determination is proposed by
Gregory (1986). If external variables appear to be insignificant this provides
evidence in favour of insider-outsider theory. The theoretical foundation for
this type of wage equation is provided by a model in which wages are
determined in a bargaining process to share rents between workers and firm.
6 Empirical results
The results of testing these hypotheses are summarized in table 1. The effect
of previous employment on wage determination was firstly studied by
Blanchard and Summers (1986). They find strong evidence in favour of their
insider-outsider hypothesis for the UK, Germany and France, but not for the
US. This result is criticized by Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988). These
authors argue that Blanchard and Summers wrongly approximate the natural
rate of unemployment by a linear instead of a quadratic time trend.
Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) do not attribute the differential experiences
in Europe, the US and Japan to insider-outsider effects, but to sluggishness in
labour demand in Europe. The estimation results obtained by Graafland (1988,
1989) confirm the conclusion by Blanchard and Summers that insider-outsider
effects are more important in Europe than in the US. In my opinion the
evidence in favour of the insider-outsider theory is not as strong as it seems
to be at first sight. Firstly, Blanchard and Summers and Graafland adopt a
Phillips curve approach and assume labour supply to be constant. As argued
before, this results in a testing framework which favours the hypothesis of
hysteresis. Secondly, Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Alogoskoufis and
Manning (1988) do not include labour productivity in the regression equation.
For these two reasons I do not put much faith in the results reported above.
Microeconomic studies cast further doubt on the relevance of previous
employment. Christofides and Oswald (1989) obtain an insignificant effect of
the change in the employment level on the rate of change of the real wage for
Canada. Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) report positive effects of the change in
the employment level on the wage rate (not wage growth) in the UK, but this
result appears not to be robust if an alternative sample is used. Holmlund and
Zetterberg (1991) find a marginally significant positive effect of the lagged
employment level on the wage rate for Germany and insignificant effects for
Norway, Sweden, Finland and the US. Overall, the empirical evidence favours
neither the insider-outsider hypothesis by Blanchard and Summers (1986), nor
the one by Gottfries and Hom (1987).
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Unemployment appears to be significant in almost all empirical studies of
wage determination. The role of this variable is investigated explicitly by
Nickell and Wadhwani (1988, 1990). Estimating a firm-level wage equation on
UK data, they find strong evidence that aggregate and industry-wide
unemployment exerts a downward pressure on the wage rate, even after
allowing the firm's employment to affect wages. Pencavel (1989), using
aggregate data from the UK, reports that the labour force has a significant
negative impact on the real wage rate. Although he does not use unemploy-
ment as explanatory variable, his study shows that union wage determination
does not depend on the number of insiders only, but also on the number of
unemployed outsiders. The question whether the significance of unemployment
results from union preferences or is due to its impact on union's bargaining
power is not considered explicitly in these studies. Many authors choose the
second interpretation; see e.g. Christofides and Oswald (1989), Blanchflower
et al. (1990), Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) and Holmlund and Zetterberg
(1991).
The role of long-term unemployment in wage determination is studied by
Layard and Nickell (1987), Nickell (1987), Blanchflower and Oswald (1990),
Graafland (1988, 1990) and in chapter 3. As it is difficult to discriminate
between insider-outsider effects and duration effects, the discussion of the
empirical results in these two areas are combined. After including both the
unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment ratio in the aggregate
wage equation for the UK, Layard and Nickell (1987) and Nickell (1987) find
that the long-term unemployment ratio has a positive coefficient. This result
is interpreted as evidence in favour of the duration hypothesis. Blanchflower
and Oswald (1990), using UK microeconomic data, criticize this result by
showing that the long-term unemployment ratio becomes insignificant after
allowing for nonlinear effects of the unemployment rate on the wage rate. The
estimation results of Graafland (1988), using a Phillips curve approach, suggest
that long-term unemployed have no influence on wage determination in the
Netherlands. Graafland argues that this result supports the duration hypothesis.
In a later study Graafland (1992) finds that, besides the short-term unemploy-
ment rate or the lay-off rate, both the long-term unemployment rate and the
long-term unemployment ratio have a negative impact on the wage rate.
Graafland (1992) interprets this result as evidence against the hypothesis that
trade unions do not care about long-term unemployed. The results in Graafland
(1988), which imply that long-term unemployed have no impact on the wage
rate, are hard to reconcile to the results in Graafland (1992), which imply they
have. Perhaps the discrepancy in empirical results should be attributed to the
use of alternative specifications, namely the Phillips curve approach in
Graafland (1988) and the wage curve approach in Graafland (1992). In chapter
3, finally, the long-term unemployment rate is found to be insignificant after
including the unemployment rate itself. The conclusion drawn from this result
117is that the union cares about long-term unemployed. Combining the results of
these studies, I tend to conclude that long-term unemployment has a negative
impact on the wage rate. Therefore, I would say that there is neither
convincing evidence in favour of the duration hypothesis nor for the hypothesis
that trade unions do not care about long-term unemployed. However, the
results are too mixed to draw definite conclusions.
The question whether wage rates are determined by firm-specific (or
internal) variables or by market (or external) variables is investigated
empirically in work by Gregory (1986), Nickell and Wadhwani (1988, 1990),
Christofides and Oswald (1989), Blanchflower et al. (1990), Holmlund and
Zetterberg (1991) and Nickell and Kong (1992). Whereas Gregory (1986) uses
a Phillips curve approach, the other authors adopt a wage curve approach.
Gregory finds that labour utilization performs better than unemployment in
explaining Australian aggregate wage changes. Empirical work by Nickell and
Wadhwani (1988, 1990) indicates that wage determination in the UK is
dominated by market variables, although firm-specific variables play a role as
well. Blanchflower et al. (1990) obtain similar results, although they find no
evidence of firm-specific effects in the unskilled nonunion sector of the UK.
According to Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) external variables are more
important in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Germany than in the US. This
result suggests that under centralized wage determination external variables are
more important than under decentralized wage determination. Christofides and
Oswald (1989) also find limited influence of aggregate variables on wage
determination in Canada. Nickell and Kong (1992) conclude that both internal
and external variables affect industry wages in the UK. Further, they find that
the impact of internal factors increases with union bargaining power. The
extreme hypothesis that external variables like unemployment do not matter in
wage determination is decisively rejected.
7 Concluding remarks
The conclusions of this review are the following.
(i) The effect of previous employment on the wage rate appears to be small or
insignificant.
(ii) There is firm evidence that unemployment plays a role in wage determi-
nation. This does not falsify insider-outsider theory; it is quite likely that
unemployment enters the wage equation because it affects the alternative
options available to the bargaining parties.
(iii) Long-term unemployment is significant in wage determination as well.
Possibly, the negative impact of long-term unemployment on the wage rate is
(absolutely) smaller than the impact of short-term unemployment. Duration
effects appear to be weak or absent.
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(iv) Estimation of wage equations at firm or industry level reveals that besides
external or aggregate variables, internal or firm-specific variables have an
impact on wages. The impact of internal variables appears to be small in the
Scandinavian countries, somewhat larger in Germany and the UK, and to be
the largest in the US. The significance of the internal or firm-specific variables
suggests that bargaining or rent-sharing models provide a better explanation for
wage determination than the standard competitive model,
(v) Insider-outsider and duration effects may cause some persistence in
unemployment; the effects are, however, not strong enough to cause full
hysteresis.
Further research is required at the following issues.
(i) The discrimination between rival theories of wage and employment
determination is hardly touched. For example, it is unclear whether unem-
ployment affects wage determination because unions care about unemployed
or because it weakens the bargaining power of the employed workers,
(ii) There is little empirical evidence whether wages and employment adjust
symmetrically to positive and negative shocks.
(iii) The impact of training costs on wage determination, emphasized by
Lindbeck and Snower (1988), is not tested empirically,
(iv) More empirical work, preferably at micro level, is necessary to check the
robustness of the results obtained so far.
1198 Concluding remarks
Abstract '
This chapter summarizes and concludes the study. Furthermore, It
discusses some policy implications and offers some suggestions for
further research.
1211 Summary and conclusions
The results of the study can be summarized as follows. Chapter 2 shows
that trade unions are economic agents whose behaviour can be integrated in
economic theory to explain wage formation and employment. The impact of
trade unions on unemployment is less clear. This issue is taken up in the
next chapter.
Chapter 3 presents an empirical model of union wage setting, employ-
ment and unemployment. The model is estimated with annual aggregate
data for the Dutch private sector from 1965 until 1987. The results suggest
that the increase of taxes and that of the discrepancy between consumer and
producer prices (partially due to value added taxes) and the increase of
benefits have caused an increase of the equilibrium unemployment rate in
the Netherlands in this period.
Chapter 4 considers whether efficiency wage effects can explain unem-
ployment. The efficiency wage theory argues that it may be profitable for
the firm to pay more than the market clearing wage to increase the workers'
productivity. A theoretical objection is that more complex contracts can be
devised which provide incentives to workers without causing unemploy-
ment. There is some empirical evidence that high wages improve worker
productivity; whether the effect is sufficiently strong and wide-spread to
cause unemployment is questionable. Further, the chapter shows a new
result with respect to the interaction between efficiency wage and insider-
outsider effects. The insider-outsider theory argues that employed workers
(insiders) have more market power than unemployed (outsiders). This
market power enables the insiders to obtain wages above the market
clearing level, while outsiders remain unemployed. The theoretical model
shows that efficiency wage and insider-outsider effects reinforce one
another if the insider has complete market power. Whether this result also
holds in other situations remains to be assessed.
Chapter 5 presents an empirical application of the efficiency wage theory
and the theory of union wage formation. The efficiency wage theory is used
to explain wage drift, whereas the theory of union wage formation is used
to explain contract wage changes. The estimates for the Netherlands (1972-
1983) imply that there is an inverse relationship between contract wage
changes and wage drift. In other words, wage drift reduces the impact of
wage moderation by trade unions on employment.
The analysis of chapter 6 is also based on the theory of union wage
formation. The central question is whether the probability for unemployed
workers to get a job depends on the cause of their unemployment. Two
possible causes of unemployment are distinguished. The first cause of
unemployment is insider-outsider effects. In this situation the union does not
care about unemployed. The second cause of unemployment is lack of
122human capital. This lack may be caused by the duration of unemployment.
It appears that the probability for unemployed workers to get a job depends
on the cause of their unemployment. Under monopoly unionism unprivi-
leged workers (outsiders, untrained workers) are more likely to be hired if
their unemployment was due to a lack of human capital than if the union
does not care about them. Under efficient bargaining unprivileged workers
prefer powerful unionism if their unemployment was due to a lack of
human capital. If their unemployment is due to the fact that the union does
not care about them, powerful unionism may hinder their employment.
Chapter 7 considers the empirical implications of insider-outsider effects
on wages, employment and unemployment persistence. Furthermore, it
provides a survey of empirical studies in this area. It appears that there is
little evidence in favour of a lagged employment effect on the wage rate. It
is clear that unemployment has a negative impact on wages. Long-term
unemployment reduces wages as well, but perhaps at a lower rate than
short-term unemployment. The insider-outsider and duration effects are not
strong enough to cause full hysteresis.
2 Policy implications
The study has the following policy implications. The study of union wage
formation, employment and unemployment of chapter 3 implies that pay-roll
and income taxes, social security contributions, indirect taxes and benefits
may increase equilibrium unemployment. It seems desirable to stabilize or
decrease the tax burden, to reduce the number of workers on sick leave, etc.
The analysis of contract wage changes and wage drift in chapter 5 suggests
that the impact of wage moderation by trade unions is diminished by wage
drift. It further indicates that wage control measures by the government are
not very effective. The theoretical models in chapter 6 suggest that human
capital matters in wage formation. The policy implication of the models is
that a subsidy of training costs may enhance employment of untrained
workers such as long-term unemployed. It is even better, but also more
difficult, to prevent losses of human capital by eliminating long-term
unemployment.
3 Suggestions for further research
The study is concluded by offering some suggestions for further research.
The study of the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in chapter 3
concentrates on imperfect competition in the labour market. If the determi-
nation of wages and prices is considered as 'a battle of the mark-ups' (see
Layard and Nickell (1986)), the analysis can be improved by including
123imperfect competition in the product market. An empirical study along these
lines is provided by Nickell and Kong (1992) for 14 two-digit industrial
sectors in Britain. Chapter 4 shows that insider-outsider and efficiency wage
effects reinforce one another if the insider has complete market power. It
would be interesting to generalize this result in case the insider has no
complete market power. The empirical study of contract wage changes and
wage drift in chapter 5 could be repeated on a larger data set, for example
on panel data of several industries. Chapter 6 presents a static analysis of
the impact of human capital or duration effects on wage formation and
employment. The dynamic impact of human capital or duration effects on
unemployment can be investigated by integrating wage formation theory
and matching theory in a single model. The survey in chapter 7 shows that
insider-outsider effects may cause unemployment persistence. An interesting
subject for further research is whether wages and employment adjust
symmetrically in booms and slumps.
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140Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft aan dat het onderzoek gaat over de invloed van loon-
vorming op werkgelegenheid en werkloosheid. Het onderzoek maakt deel
uit van het project "Arbeidsmarkt en arbeidsorganisaties".
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt betoogd dat vakbonden beschouwd kunnen worden
als economische agenten. De integratie van vakbonden in de economische
theorie blijkt bij te kunnen dragen aan de verklaring van loonvorming en
werkgelegenheid. De invloed van vakbonden op werkloosheid is tot nu toe
minder duidelijk. Deze invloed wordt nader onderzocht in het volgende
hoofdstuk.
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert een empirisch model voor collectieve loon-
vorming, werkgelegenheid en werkloosheid. Het model wordt geschat met
geaggregeerde data voor de Nederlandse private sector (1965-1987). De
resultaten suggereren dat de stijging van de belasting- en premiedruk, de
toenemende discrepantie russen consumenten- en producentenprijzen (o.a.
vanwege indirecte belastingen en de invloed van invoerprijzen) en de
stijging van de uitkeringsvoet hebben bijgedragen aan de stijging van de
werkloosheid in Nederland in deze periode.
Hoofdstuk 4 beschouwt de vraag in hoeverre de efficiëntieloon-theorie
het bestaan van werkloosheid kan verklaren. Deze theorie zegt dat het voor
de werkgever winstgevend kan zijn meer te betalen dan het marktruimend
loon omdat dit leidt tot een hogere produktiviteit van de werknemers. De
theorie impliceert dat de resulterende werkloosheid een evenwichtsverschijn-
sel is. Een theoretisch bezwaar tegen de efficiëntieloon-verklaring is dat
meer ingewikkelde contracten opgesteld kunnen worden die werknemers
prikkels geven om goed te presteren zonder werkloosheid te veroorzaken.
Empirisch gezien is er wel enig bewijs dat hoge lonen de produktiviteit van
werknemers verbeteren. Het is echter twijfelachtig of deze effecten vol-
doende sterk en wijd verbreid zijn om werkloosheid te veroorzaken. Ten-
slotte toont het hoofdstuk een nieuw resultaat betreffende de relatie tussen
efficiëntieloon-effecten en insider-outsider effecten. Met insider-outsider '
effecten wordt bedoeld dat werkenden (insiders) meer macht hebben dan
werklozen (outsiders) in de loononderhandelingen. Hierdoor kunnen de
werkenden loonsverhogingen afdwingen terwijl werklozen moeilijk aan een
baan kunnen komen. Het theoretisch model toont aan dat efficiëntieloon- en
' De term "outsider" kan vertaald worden met "buitenstaander". De
term "insider" betekent zoiets als "ingewijde". Een vertaling voor insider
analoog aan die voor outsider zou "binnenstaander" kunnen luiden. Aan-
gezien deze vertalingen geen schoonheidsprijs verdienen is er voor gekozen
de termen onvertaald te laten.
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loonvoet, elkaar versterken als de insider volledige marktmacht heeft. Of dit
ook geldt in andere situaties is moeilijker te bewijzen.
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert een empirische toepassing van de efficiëntieloon-
theorie en de theorie van collectieve loonvorming. De efficiëntieloontheorie
wordt gebruikt om loondrift te verklaren. Dit is het verschijnsel dat de lonen
sneller stijgen dan de contractlonen. De theorie van collectieve loonvorming
wordt gebruikt om veranderingen van het contractloon te verklaren. De
schattingen voor Nederland (1972-1983) impliceren een inverse relatie
tussen veranderingen van het contractloon en loondrift. Een implicatie
hiervan is dat loondrift het werkgelegenheidseffect van loonmatiging door
vakbonden vermindert.
De analyse van hoofdstuk 6 is eveneens gebaseerd op de theorie van
collectieve loonvorming. De centrale vraag is in hoeverre de kans op
werkgelegenheid voor werkloze werknemers afhankelijk is van de oorzaak
van hun werkloosheid. Er worden twee mogelijke oorzaken van werkloos-
heid onderscheiden. Ten eerste, werkloosheid die veroorzaakt wordt door
insider-outsider effecten. Hierbij behartigt de vakbond alleen de belangen
van de werkenden. Ten tweede, werkloosheid die veroorzaakt wordt door
gebrek aan menselijk kapitaal. Dit gebrek aan menselijk kapitaal kan
veroorzaakt zijn door langdurige werkloosheid. Onder een monopolistische
vakbond hebben werkloze werknemers meer kans op werkgelegenheid als
hun werkloosheid te wijten is aan gebrek aan menselijk kapitaal dan als de
vakbond zich niet voor hun werkgelegenheid interesseert. Onder efficiënte
onderhandelingen is een sterke vakbond voordelig voor werknemers die
werkloos zijn wegens gebrek aan menselijk kapitaal. Als de vakbond zich
niet voor hen interesseert, dan kan de sterkte van de vakbond hun werk-
gelegenheid juist belemmeren. Blijkbaar is de oorzaak van de werkloosheid
van invloed op de kans op een baan.
Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft de empirische implicaties van verschillende typen
insider-outsider effecten op de loonvoet, de werkgelegenheid en de werk-
loosheid. Verder geeft het een overzicht van de empirische studies op dit
terrein. De verschillende typen insider-outsider effecten blijken te leiden tot
een negatieve invloed van de werkgelegenheid in de vorige periode, geen
invloed van werkloosheid en geen invloed van langdurige werkloosheid op
de loonvoet. Uit het empirisch overzicht blijkt dat er weinig bewijs is voor
de invloed van vertraagde werkgelegenheid op de loonvoet. Werkloosheid
blijkt duidelijk een negatieve invloed te hebben op de loonvoet. Langdurige
werkloosheid vermindert de lonen ook, maar mogelijk minder sterk dan kort
durende werkloosheid. De gevonden insider-outsider effecten kunnen wel
persistentie in de werkloosheid veroorzaken, maar geen volledige hysterese.
Hoofdstuk 8, tenslotte, bevat bovenstaande samenvatting. Verder geeft het
de volgende beleidsimplicaties van het onderzoek: stabilisatie of verlaging
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van de belasting- en premiedruk draagt bij aan verlaging van de werkloos-
heid; loonmaatregelen van de overheid lijken weinig effectief; training en
werkervaring voor langdurig werklozen draagt bij aan loonmatiging en
zodoende aan hun werkgelegenheid. Tenslotte bevat het als suggesties voor
verder onderzoek: een onderzoek naar de invloed van onvolkomen concur-
rentie op de goederenmarkt op de loonvoet en de evenwichtswerkloosheid;
een verder empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen contractlonen en
loondrift op basis van paneldata voor meerdere sectoren; een onderzoek
naar de dynamische implicaties van de effecten van menselijk kapitaal of
werkloosheidsduur op loonvorming en werkloosheid.
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